The forecast

Correction. When we published this forecast, we put about 81% on "both sides win". That figure counted only the US side: whether more Canadian resources reach the US. What Canada nets has since counted Canada's side: Canada comes out ahead if its resource gains since 2024 outweigh what the tariffs cost it. Counting the US side by supply and Canada's side by income, the forecast comes out about the same, around 83%, if today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did, and about 7% if they never end. Either way, the war years leave Canada behind over the decade. The forecast keeps its name; its test now has two parts, and the corrections log has the old wording.

Canada's crude exports to buyers outside the United States more than tripled in two years, from about 126,000 barrels a day in 2023 to about 445,000 in 2025, after the Trans Mountain pipeline to the Pacific coast nearly tripled in capacity in May 2024.¹ Oil going to the US still grew, from about 3.87 to about 3.95 million barrels a day (down from about 4.06 million in 2024).²³⁴

Canada sold more elsewhere, and the US still got more. Our main forecast has two sides. The US side is that this holds for the next decade, carried by oil, gas, uranium and potash, with metals roughly holding their ground. Canada's side is that Canada comes out ahead too: its resource gains since 2024 outweigh what the tariffs cost it. The US side is a forecast with published odds, which we will score in public; Canada's side is shown as our model's estimates, because no public figure in 2034 will settle it. Neither is a claim that Washington designed any of this.

Chart · kb/d

How to read this: One bar per period, starting at zero, so heights compare directly. Series are grouped side by side within each period, in legend order. Hover a point or bar for its exact period and value.

Source

• Canada Energy Regulator, “CER Commodity Statistics: Crude Oil - Summary Export by Destination, monthly, light, medium and heavy, m3/d by PADD I-V and Other, January 2024 to July 2026”, 2026-10-19.

At a glance	Details
The forecast	"Both sides win": in 2034, clearly more Canadian resources reach the US than in 2024, by more than ordinary yearly swings, and Canada comes out ahead: its resource gains since 2024 outweigh what the tariffs cost it
The odds, US side	About 85%, from our volume model
Canada's side, in our model	Ahead in 2034 unless about 57% of today's tariff damage is still in place: in 98% of runs if the tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did, about 9% if they never end. Behind over 2025 to 2034 as a whole in most runs
Both sides (US by supply, Canada by income)	About 83% if the tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did; about 7% if they never end (corrected: we first gave about 81% for the US side alone)
The main risks	US side: new pipe to the coast outgrowing new oil production. Canada's side: tariffs that last
What we watch	Investment under the new laws, a stalled build-out, BC's October 24 election, the next pipeline south, how long the tariffs last and any deal

What "both sides win" means

The US gets more energy, and more secure energy. Canada provided 63.4% of America's crude oil imports in 2025 and close to all of its natural gas imports,⁵ and 56% of its aluminum imports from 2021 to 2024.⁶ We expect the build-out under way to add to those flows, not divert them.

Canada gets a bigger resource base and the ability to sell elsewhere, through new pipelines, ports and LNG terminals on its coasts, net of what it pays for them. Its aluminum has shown how: under US tariffs in 2025, about 470,000 tonnes went to the Netherlands and Italy, up from about 95,000 in 2024.⁷

Why the trade war matters

For a decade before 2025, Canada's big export projects kept dying on paper.

• Northern Gateway, to the BC coast: approved by Ottawa in 2014, approval quashed by a court in 2016,⁸ killed by the Trudeau government that November.⁹
• Energy East, to the Atlantic: dropped in 2017.¹⁰
• Teck's Frontier oil sands mine: withdrawn in 2020, Teck saying the framework investors wanted, one reconciling resource development and climate change, "does not yet exist here today".¹¹
• Keystone XL: dead in 2021, after Washington revoked its permit.¹²
• Trans Mountain: went ahead only after its owner stopped spending and Ottawa bought it, in 2018.¹³¹⁴

Then came the tariffs, on February 1, 2025. A week later, the US energy secretary said "it's hard to build new pipeline capacity" in Canada.¹⁵

Event · 2025-02-01 · action · USExecutive Order 14193 imposes a 25% tariff on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy, citing "the failure of Canada to do more" on drugs

Executive Order 14193 imposes a 25% tariff on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy, citing "the failure of Canada to do more" on drugs

President Trump signed Executive Order 14193 on 1 February 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The order said "the failure of Canada to do more" to intercept drug traffickers and drugs, fentanyl among them, was an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the United States, and set an additional 25% duty on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy from 4 February. On 3 February the tariffs were paused for 30 days; they took effect on 4 March 2025.

Documented by

• The White House, “Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border”, 2025-02-01.
• Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents (GovInfo), “Executive Order 14193: Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border”, 2025-02-01.
• Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-Canada Relations amid Tariffs Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act”, 2025-04-14.

Event · 2025-02-07 · statement · USEnergy Secretary Wright, asked on CNBC whether Canada could ship its oil west to sell overseas, says new pipeline capacity is hard to build and the existing West Coast route is small

Energy Secretary Wright, asked on CNBC whether Canada could ship its oil west to sell overseas, says new pipeline capacity is hard to build and the existing West Coast route is small

Asked earlier in the interview what tariffs would do to oil prices, Wright said the Canadian energy system is integrated with the US one, with pipelines feeding US refineries tuned for heavy Canadian crude, and "I don't think we're going to see that change"; "As the President has said, this is a drug war." When CNBC's Brian Sullivan then asked whether Canada might answer tariffs by shipping its oil "to Vancouver" to sell overseas, Wright replied: "It's hard to build new pipeline capacity. Canada does have a West Coast pipeline, which is running today and exporting oil to Asia, but that's that's 10% or less than 10% of Canadian oil production."

Documented by

• CNBC, “CNBC transcript: Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Squawk on the Street”, 2025-02-07.

Within five months, three fast-track laws passed: British Columbia's Infrastructure Projects Act (Bill 15 (BC)), Ontario's Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act (Bill 5 (ON)) and Parliament's One Canadian Economy Act (incl. Building Canada Act) (C-5), which aims to cut decisions on major projects "from five years down to two years".¹⁶ Prime Minister Carney called it "tailor-made to respond to this pivotal moment".¹⁷ A federal Major Projects Office opened in August,¹⁸ and Building Canada Strong Act (C-39), a follow-up bill, was introduced in September 2026.

Event · 2025-06-26 · action · CABill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, including the Building Canada Act for national-interest projects, receives Royal Assent

Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, including the Building Canada Act for national-interest projects, receives Royal Assent

Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, received Royal Assent on 26 June 2025, less than three weeks after it was introduced on 6 June. It enacted two laws: the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act, which removes federal barriers to trade and labour mobility between provinces, and the Building Canada Act, which came into force the same day. The Building Canada Act lets cabinet list projects it considers in the national interest; for those projects, the findings needed for federal approvals are deemed to be made in the project's favour, the minister can issue a single document that stands for the specified federal authorizations, and cabinet can by regulation exempt them from provisions of the federal laws listed in the Act. The government said a new Major Projects Office would lead the work.

Documented by

• Parliament of Canada (LEGISinfo), “Bill C-5 (45-1): An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act and the Building Canada Act”.
• Justice Laws (Canada), “Building Canada Act (S.C. 2025, c. 2, s. 5), full text”.
• Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat (Government of Canada), “Legislation to build One Canadian Economy receives Royal Assent”, 2025-06-26.

The trade war didn't start the build-out. Trans Mountain's expansion entered service in May 2024,¹⁹ LNG Canada's investment decision dates from 2018,²⁰ and the fight over approvals is older: in 2023 the Supreme Court found most of the 2019 federal review law unconstitutional.²¹ An April 2025 election, which kept the Liberals in power under a new leader, fell in the same months, so the tariffs are not the only possible cause. What changed after February 2025 is the pace and the politics.

Event · 2025-04-28 · action · CAFederal election: Carney's Liberals win 169 of 343 seats, three short of a majority, after a campaign dominated by Trump's tariffs and annexation talk

Federal election: Carney's Liberals win 169 of 343 seats, three short of a majority, after a campaign dominated by Trump's tariffs and annexation talk

Canadians voted on 28 April 2025 in a snap election called by Prime Minister Mark Carney. Final results published by Elections Canada on 23 May, after validations and judicial recounts, gave the Liberals 169 of 343 seats, three short of a majority, and the Conservatives 144, the UK House of Commons Library reported. Carney campaigned as the leader best placed to deal with President Trump, who had imposed tariffs on Canada and talked of annexing it, and for many voters the election became a referendum on who could stand up to him. The hockey phrase "elbows up" had become a popular rallying cry for resisting the US, ABC News noted.

Documented by

• Liberal Party of Canada, “Liberal Party of Canada 2025 platform, 'Canada Strong' (66-page PDF)”, 2025-04-19.
• Conservative Party of Canada (mirror at mediapolicy.ca), “Conservative Party of Canada 2025 platform, 'Canada First—For a Change'”, 2025-04-22.
• House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), “Canada: 2025 federal election”, 2025-07-03.

Why we count barrels, not shares

By volume, the US share of Canada's crude exports fell from about 97% to about 90% between 2023 and 2025, while the volume going south rose. So we measure what the US actually receives: the volume reaching it.

Rung	What happens	Our odds (US side)
O0	Canada's resource build-out does not speed up meaningfully	15% for O0 and O1 together
O1	It speeds up, but the extra output goes mostly to other buyers; the volume to the US stays flat or falls
O2	It speeds up, and the volume to the US grows, even if the US share of Canada's exports falls	62%
O3	As O2, plus locked-in preferential terms for the US: a government supply guarantee or right of first refusal, or a US government stake, purchase contract or price floor of US$100 million or more in a project in Canada	23%

The US side of "both sides win" means O2 or higher: about 85%. That is the figure from the journal's own volume model, below, and it is checked in 2034 against 2024. O2 counts only if the yearly value of Canadian resources reaching the US is more than about US$4 billion above 2024, about 3% of that year's total, so that ordinary year-to-year swings don't count. Prices are held fixed, so a price rise never counts either. It is not, on its own, the chance that both sides win. We first presented it as if it were; Canada's side is under "Net of Canada's costs", below.

The 23% for O3 comes from a second model, described below, because the volume model can't see contract terms. The odds table counts O2 as "this level or higher", so its 85% includes the 23% for O3.

Current odds · outcome

These odds come from our models, whose rules are written down before they run; each row is the result of its model’s current official run. Rows can overlap (an “or higher” row includes the rows above it).

Code	Explanation	Odds	Range	As of
O0	No meaningful speed-up	no estimate
O1	Faster, but the extra output goes mostly elsewhere	no estimate
O2	Faster, and more volume reaches the US (this level or higher)	85%		2026-10-22
O3	Locked-in preferential terms for the US	23%	7%–39%	2026-10-22

O0 and O1 together: 15% (what is left over). These odds measure the US side only, how much reaches the US; they say nothing about whether Canada comes out ahead. Canada's side is under "Net of Canada's costs", below.

What the model says

It asks one question: by the mid-2030s, is the yearly value of Canadian oil, gas, power, uranium, potash and metals reaching the US more than about US$4 billion above 2024? For each project that adds capacity, it draws whether the project gets built (odds set by its stage), adds up what reaches the US, and repeats this 20,000 times, drawing every uncertain input from a sourced range.

It gives O2 or higher in about 85% of those futures, with a median of US$9.1 billion a year more than in 2024 (one run in ten below US$2.3 billion, one in ten above US$14.7 billion). Without metals: about 87% and US$9.6 billion.

The bar is US$4 billion. Growth has to clear US$4 billion a year, so small gains don't count. LNG Canada's Phase 2, approved on September 29 and now under construction, trims the gas figure, because the model assumes a quarter of the gas for new LNG would otherwise have gone to the US. Oil carries most of the gain:

Commodity	Adds a year, US$
Oil	about 6.0 billion
Gas	2.2 billion
Power	about nothing
Uranium	1.0 billion
Potash	0.44 billion
Metals	about -0.1 billion

Each row is that commodity's own median; medians don't add up to the total's.

Oil is a race between new production and new pipe to the coast. The regulator's range for western Canada runs from 81,000 to 872,000 extra barrels a day by 2034, with 451,000 in its central case.²² When new coast pipe outgrows new production, barrels are pulled away from US buyers: about one run in seven.

Power adds about nothing, like for like. Two new lines to New England and New York are running, but they only make up for sales Hydro-Québec is losing elsewhere: in a year of normal rain and snow, the regulator puts Canada's electricity exports at about 59 terawatt-hours in 2024 and about 57 in 2034.²² We don't forecast rain and snow, so we compare a normal year with a normal year.

One caveat. 2024 was in fact a drought year: Canada exported only about 36 terawatt-hours, against 60 to 73 a year from 2015 to 2022.²³ Growth measured from there would mostly be water coming back, not building, so we don't count it. But if 2034 is a normal year, the check in 2034 will make electricity look about US$2 billion a year better than our model does, for reasons that have nothing to do with building.

Metals add a little, and mostly go elsewhere. New nickel, cobalt, lithium, graphite, copper, zinc, rare earths and tungsten add about US$1.0 billion a year for the US, out of about US$4.2 billion of new output. The rest goes to buyers in Asia and Europe, processors in Canada, Volkswagen's battery arm²⁴ and Ottawa, which has agreed to buy graphite for a stockpile.²⁵

The US share mostly goes where the US paid for it: Ford's lithium,²⁶ GM's graphite,²⁷ rare-earth metal for US defence suppliers,²⁸ and a cobalt refinery and a tungsten mine with Pentagon awards.²⁹³⁰

Aluminum is the one metal the tariffs hit. In 2024, Canada sent 94% of its unwrought aluminum exports to the US. After US tariffs of 25%, then 50%, in 2025,³¹ shipments south fell by more than a quarter.⁷ Other countries made up only about a quarter of the shortfall in US imports,³²³³ and US buyers paid more, not less: in the second quarter of 2026, a Midwest premium of about US$2,500 a tonne over the London price, against about US$580 in Europe.³⁴

Event · 2025-06-04 · action · USUS Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum double from 25% to 50% on 4 June 2025 for all countries except the UK

US Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum double from 25% to 50% on 4 June 2025 for all countries except the UK

President Trump's Proclamation 10947, signed on 3 June 2025, raised the Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum and their derivative products from 25% to 50% from 12:01 a.m. on 4 June 2025. Imports from the United Kingdom stayed at 25% under the US-UK trade deal of May 2025, with the rate open to adjustment from 9 July. Canadian steel and aluminum were subject to the full 50%.

Documented by

• Federal Register (Executive Office of the President), “Proclamation 10947: Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel Into the United States”, 2025-06-03.
• Blakes (Blake, Cassels & Graydon), “U.S.–Canada Tariffs: Timeline of Key Dates and Documents”, 2026-09-04.

How much comes back depends on the deal Canada gets. The last time the US lifted an aluminum tariff for Canada, in May 2019,³⁵ imports from Canada rose from about 140,000 tonnes a month to about 200,000 for the rest of the year, and by 2021 were above their level before the tariff.³⁶ What would bring most Canadian metal back is a better deal (a full exemption, as in 2019, or at least a lower rate), not the end of the tariff.

Some won't come back. A 750,000-tonne smelter is planned in Oklahoma,³⁴ and a July 2026 proclamation lets companies that build US smelters import as much metal as their new plant will make, at half the tariff.³⁷ That discount was first offered in October 2025, only to Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum makers that committed to new US capacity: tariff relief for American plants.³⁸ The quota also tells us Washington expects its aluminum tariff on other countries to last.

So our central case weighs three possible settlements. In August 2026, the US reportedly offered to cut its 50% tariff on Canadian aluminum to 25%, with quotas on products made from it.³⁹

Aluminum settlement	Our weight	O2 or higher	Median, more a year to the US
Full exemption, as in 2019 (the good case)	45%	about 89%	US$10.0 billion
A deal at 25%	30%	about 86%
The 50% lasts into the 2030s	25%	about 76%	US$7.2 billion

Weighed that way, aluminum's typical loss to the US is about US$1.1 billion a year and other metals' typical gain about US$1.0 billion. Because aluminum's loss can be much larger (one run in ten above US$3.6 billion), metals on average take about US$0.50 billion a year off the total and lower the median from US$9.6 billion to US$9.1 billion. More still reaches the US.

Even if metals lose ground, the US side barely changes. Counting oil and other energy, more still reaches the US, and metal follows demand: if US demand outgrows what US smelters and other suppliers can cover, Canadian metal can come back fast.

The model's limits. The odds that a project gets built are only partly drawn from history: for an approved or postponed project they come from our count of past Canadian resource and energy projects (how many of those at that stage since 2014 were in service within eight years), and a project listed as of national interest gets the approved odds; for the other stages they are our judgment. So is the aluminum settlement, and with it how much metal returns to the US, which is why we show each one. Prices only serve to add different commodities together, so a price rise never counts as growth. Gold and silver (traded as bullion) and iron ore (almost all shipped overseas) are left out. And the model can't see contract terms, so it says nothing about O3.

The US$4 billion bar comes from history. It is about how much the same fixed-price total moves between two single years for ordinary reasons (fires, droughts, slow years), measured from 2010 to 2025. A higher bar would lower the odds: at US$8 billion, about 60%.

Where things stand today

1. The southbound capacity is already committed. For less to reach the US, a slowdown wouldn't be enough; it would take a shock.

• Enbridge Mainline Optimization Phase 1: final investment decision in November 2025; 150,000 more barrels a day to US refiners, due in 2027.⁴⁰
• New England Clean Energy Connect (NECEC) (1,200 MW) and Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) (1,250 MW): new power lines to the US Northeast, in service in 2026.⁴¹⁴²
• Two Saskatchewan uranium mines under construction: Denison Wheeler River (Phoenix ISR) uranium project, first production targeted by mid-2028,⁴³ and NexGen Rook I uranium mine, whose announced sales are with US utilities.⁴⁴

Most of the model's losing runs (about three in five) have weak production growth and a big new coast pipeline. Neither is in place today: production is still growing, and the proposed Pacific Link (West Coast oil pipeline) has no final investment decision.

The pipeline did move a step closer on October 1, 2026, when the federal government listed it as the first project of national interest under the Building Canada Act. Its conditions are still to be set, but the listing raises the model's odds that it gets built, and more oil to the coast means less growth going south, which lowers the odds of O2 or higher.

Event · 2026-10-01 · action · CACarney lists the West Coast oil pipeline, renamed Pacific Link, as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act

Carney lists the West Coast oil pipeline, renamed Pacific Link, as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act

In Fort McMurray on 1 October 2026, Prime Minister Carney listed the West Coast oil pipeline, now called Pacific Link, as a project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act, the first project designated this way (CBC). The pipeline would carry about one million barrels a day roughly 1,250 km from Bruderheim, Alberta, to a deepwater port outside Delta, BC (Global News), on a southern route that the government says protects BC's North Coast and the Great Bear Sea. Canada and Alberta are to hold equal shares, Pembina Pipeline is the private investor and Trans Mountain Corporation leads development; Indigenous communities will be offered at least 10% ownership, financed through loan guarantees. The Major Projects Office is to finalize the conditions by 1 September 2027 (Prime Minister's Office). No final investment decision or in-service date was announced.

Documented by

• Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister Carney lists the West Coast Oil Pipeline, now known as Pacific Link, as a project of national interest”, 2026-10-01.
• Canada Gazette, “Order Amending Schedule 1 to the Building Canada Act, P.C. 2026-925 (Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 160, No. 41)”, 2026-10-10.
• BOE Report (The Canadian Press), “A timeline for Pacific Link, the national interest Alberta-B.C. pipeline plan”, 2026-10-01.

Event · 2026-07-02 · document · CACanada refers Alberta's West Coast oil pipeline to the Major Projects Office and signs the Pathways agreement with Alberta and oil sands firms

Canada refers Alberta's West Coast oil pipeline to the Major Projects Office and signs the Pathways agreement with Alberta and oil sands firms

On 2 July 2026 in Calgary, Prime Minister Carney announced that Ottawa would refer the Government of Alberta's proposal for a west coast oil pipeline to the Major Projects Office. The pipeline would carry one million barrels of oil a day, largely along the existing Trans Mountain corridor; Canada and Alberta would be equal partners, with an equity stake reserved for Indigenous Peoples, Trans Mountain Corporation leading development and Pembina Pipeline as a private investor, the Prime Minister's Office said. The same release said Canada, Alberta and the Oil Sands Alliance had reached an agreement to advance the Pathways carbon-capture project. The Canadian Press reported on 13 July that this memorandum of understanding was signed on 2 July and made public on 13 July. In it Alberta agreed to "implement financial supports to encourage the oil production growth required to underpin" the new pipeline, the expansion of Trans Mountain and other growth in export capacity; binding agreements with each company are to be signed by 15 November 2026.

Documented by

• Prime Minister's Office, “Canada and Alberta advance west coast pipeline project proposal and Pathways Project Carbon Capture Initiative – to build a stronger, more resilient Canadian economy”, 2026-07-02.
• Government of Alberta, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Canada, the Government of Alberta, and the Oil Sands Alliance parties”, 2026-07-13.
• Government of Alberta, “West Coast Oil Pipeline”.

2. The coast side is being built without draining the south. LNG Canada Phase 1 has shipped LNG since mid-2025; Cedar LNG and Woodfibre LNG are under construction; Ksi Lisims LNG is approved; on September 29, 2026, LNG Canada's partners took the final investment decision on Phase 2, two more trains that double the Kitimat plant's capacity to 28 million tonnes a year, with operations expected in the early 2030s;⁴⁵⁴⁶ and Trans Mountain drag-reducing agent project adds about 90,000 barrels a day to Trans Mountain without new pipe. The model assumes most of the gas for new LNG comes from new production.

Event · 2025-06-30 · action · CA-BCLNG Canada ships its first cargo from Kitimat, BC, bound for Asia

LNG Canada ships its first cargo from Kitimat, BC, bound for Asia

The tanker GasLog Glasgow left LNG Canada's terminal in Kitimat, BC, on 30 June 2025 with the plant's first cargo, bound for South Korea, CBC reported: Canada's first large-scale LNG export. LNG Canada is a joint venture of Shell, Petronas, PetroChina, Mitsubishi and KOGAS, and its first phase is designed to produce 14 million tonnes a year. The US Energy Information Administration put the two trains' capacity at 1.84 billion cubic feet a day and expected the plant to reach full capacity in 2026. Until then, Canada's only export market for its gas had been the United States, by pipeline.

Documented by

• LNG Canada, “First Cargo Puts Canada on the Map of LNG Exporting Nations”, 2025-06-30.
• Shell, “First cargo leaves LNG Canada”, 2025-06-30.
• US EIA, “North America’s LNG export capacity could more than double by 2029”, 2025-10-16.

Event · 2026-09-29 · action · CA-BCLNG Canada's partners take the final investment decision on Phase 2, to double the Kitimat plant's capacity to 28 million tonnes a year

LNG Canada's partners take the final investment decision on Phase 2, to double the Kitimat plant's capacity to 28 million tonnes a year

LNG Canada announced that its five joint-venture partners, Shell (40%), PETRONAS (25%), PetroChina (15%), Mitsubishi Corporation (15%) and KOGAS (5%), had taken the final investment decision on the Phase 2 expansion of its plant at Kitimat, BC. LNG Canada's release is dated 28 September 2026; the Prime Minister's Office, Shell and TC Energy announced the decision on 29 September. Phase 2 adds two LNG processing units (trains), raising the plant's capacity from 14 to 28 million tonnes a year; Shell said commercial operations are expected to begin in the early 2030s. The Prime Minister's Office and the federal Major Projects Office put the investment at $33 billion, and the Prime Minister's Office, in the title of its release, called it the second-largest single private investment in Canadian history; LNG Canada described it as one of the largest private-sector investments in Canada. The decision lets MNT Investments LP, representing the Gitga'at, Gitxaała, Haisla, Kitselas and Kitsumkalum Nations, exercise an option to invest up to C$1 billion in a special-purpose entity that will buy Phase 2's new LNG storage tank; the Prime Minister's Office and the Major Projects Office describe this as a majority ownership stake in the tank but give different sizes for it (225,000 cubic metres in the Prime Minister's Office release, 255,000 on the Major Projects Office page). Each partner remains responsible for taking its own share of the LNG produced (equity lifting); the releases name no third-party buyers. TC Energy said the decision met the conditions of its earlier conditional investment decision on Coastal GasLink Phase 2, which adds compressor stations (five, according to LNG Canada) to nearly double the pipeline's current capacity of about 2.1 billion cubic feet a day; the Prime Minister's Office says the capacity will double. TC Energy expects construction to start in early 2027 and service to begin in the early 2030s.

Documented by

• Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Carney welcomes LNG Canada Phase 2, the second-largest single private investment in Canadian history”, 2026-09-29.
• LNG Canada (via Cision Newswire), “LNG Canada Announces Phase 2 Final Investment Decision”, 2026-09-29.
• Shell, “Shell takes final investment decision to double LNG Canada capacity”, 2026-09-29.

3. Locked-in terms were asked for, and refused so far. In the August talks, Washington reportedly asked for a right of first refusal on Canadian critical minerals;⁴⁷ Prime Minister Carney named it among the demands Canada refused when he walked away.⁴⁸

Event · 2026-08-14 · statement · USReported US ask in the August 2026 trade talks: a right of first refusal on Canadian critical minerals

Reported US ask in the August 2026 trade talks: a right of first refusal on Canadian critical minerals

⚠ Caution: anonymous sources First reported by The Globe and Mail citing unnamed sources; neither government confirmed the details. Reported by an outlet citing unnamed sources.

First reported by The Globe and Mail on 2026-08-14, citing unnamed sources. S&P Global Platts, in a free relay by Hellenic Shipping News (2026-08-20), wrote: 'Among reported US demands is a right of first refusal (ROFR) on Canadian minerals, or at least preferential access to them, according to media reports citing unnamed sources'; neither government confirmed details. Investing News and NetNewsLedger also reported the ask. After the talks broke down, Carney told a news conference on 2026-08-22 that Canada 'would never give exclusive access' to critical minerals (Canadian Press), and a Canadian Press fact check says he highlighted US demands to 'grant a right-of-first-refusal to Canada's critical mineral exports'. Claims that the minerals would be sold 'at capped prices' with 'priority access' to oil, gas, nuclear and hydro come from an unsourced viral list that the Canadian Press fact check could not confirm. No credible source gives terms (which minerals, price or duration).

Documented by

• Hellenic Shipping News, “US demand for right of first refusal on Canadian minerals 'impossible': experts (syndicated S&P Global Platts copy)”, 2026-08-18.
• IndexBox, “US-Canada Trade Talks: Blanket Right of First Refusal on Canadian Minerals Unworkable, Experts Say”, 2026-08-20.
• 650 CKOM (The Canadian Press), “Five things: PM Carney explains why Canada left the U.S. negotiating table”, 2026-08-22.

Event · 2026-08-21 · statement · CACarney walks away from the tentative deal after late US demands on autos, culture and Canada's other trade deals

Carney walks away from the tentative deal after late US demands on autos, culture and Canada's other trade deals

⚠ Caution: self-reported The late US demands are described in Carney's own account; US Trade Representative Greer blamed new Canadian demands instead. The precise terms of the final US offer are not public. Only one side’s own account of itself.

Talks on the tentative Canada-US deal unravelled on the evening of Friday 21 August 2026, and Prime Minister Carney announced early on Saturday 22 August that he had told Canada's negotiators to walk away; the US 50% tariffs took effect at 12:01 a.m. that day, CBC News reported. Carney said the US had added late demands on autos, including exempting some vehicles from tariffs but not others, on Canada's support for French-language culture and media and on bilingual labelling, and, "in the last hours," language to restrict Canada's ability to have other trade deals. "We cannot accept what they've offered, and we will not give what they've asked," he said.

Documented by

• Radio-Canada International (CBC News), “Carney says trade deal became untenable when U.S. 'asked too much and offered too little'”, 2026-08-22.
• The Hub, “Lutnick's late demands sank Canada-U.S. trade deal that analysts say beat the alternative”, 2026-08-25. paywalled

Nothing is locked in. The US declined to renew the continental trade agreement in its current form, putting it under yearly reviews, though a bigger renegotiation stays possible.⁴⁹⁵⁰ The US wants the top rung, and Canada has so far said no.

Our 23% for O3 comes from a count. We looked at the US's dealings with its closest resource partners (Canada, Mexico, Japan, Australia and the EU) since 2017, nearly 49 partner-years, and counted the deals that lock in terms of this kind. Then we adjusted for what is different now: yearly reviews of the trade agreement, Canada's refusal in August, and Washington's new practice of taking stakes in mining and processing projects. That gives about 27% that terms of this kind are in force in 2034. O3 also needs O2, so we combine it with O2's 85%, treating the two as independent: about 23%.

The count is thin. Only one deal meets our bar: a US$174 million stake by the US Department of War in a gallium plant in Australia, announced in September 2026.⁵¹ So the range is wide, from about 7% to 39%, and counting only the period since January 2025 would raise it to about 65%. It is checked in 2034, with the rest of the forecast.

What counts as "locked in" changes the answer, so we show three bars. We use the middle one. A strict bar, counting only a government supply guarantee, a right of first refusal or priority access, gives about 4%. The middle bar adds US government stakes, purchase contracts or price floors of US$100 million or more in a project in Canada: 23%. A broad bar, adding any binding clause in a trade agreement that favours US buyers of Canadian resources, gives about 36%.

Net of Canada's costs

Canada's side of the win isn't free: tariffs on its other exports, public money and tax breaks such as the proposed Productivity Mega Deduction, faster reviews that critics say cut consultation short, and environmental and legal risk. When we published this forecast, we said Canada still comes out ahead, before setting those costs against its gains. Who pays sets out who carries them; What Canada nets adds up the ones our model can price. Canada comes out ahead if its resource gains since 2024 outweigh what the tariffs cost it, and for 2034 that turns on how much of today's tariff damage is still in place:

Tariff damage still in place in 2034	Canada ahead in 2034, in our model	Both sides (US by supply, Canada by income)
None: the trade war is over	100%	About 85%
About a quarter: today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did	98%	About 83%
Half	62%	About 50%
All of it: the tariffs never end	9%	About 7%

Canada comes out ahead in 2034 unless about 57% of the damage is still in place. The decade is a different count: added up from 2025 to 2034, the war years leave Canada behind in 95% of our runs, typically by about C$89 billion, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back. Canada's side is given as our model's estimates by tariff condition rather than odds, because no public figure in 2034 will settle it: the tariff damage will still be an estimate. Faster reviews and legal risk are not in the count, and emissions sit beside it.

What we now expect: the build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more Canadian supply either way; counted as income, the trade war costs Americans more than the build-out adds. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.

What would change the forecast

Whether money follows the new laws. If C-39 and the tax deduction pass, do investors commit? One sign would be Enbridge reviving the second phase of its expansion, another 250,000 barrels a day south, postponed in July.⁵²

Event · 2026-07-31 · action · CAEnbridge postpones Mainline Optimization Phase 2 (+250,000 barrels a day, Alberta to North Dakota) because producers won't commit

Enbridge postpones Mainline Optimization Phase 2 (+250,000 barrels a day, Alberta to North Dakota) because producers won't commit

Enbridge said Canadian oil producers had not committed to the 250,000-barrel-a-day second phase. Coverage cited oil-price volatility since the start of the Iran war and the fact that the federal–Alberta energy agreement remains non-binding. Phase 1 (about 150,000 barrels a day) reached a final investment decision in November 2025.

Documented by

• Global News, “Canada's Enbridge postpones plans for second phase of Mainline oil pipeline expansion”, 2026-07-31.
• East Daley, “Enbridge Shelves Mainline Optimization Phase 2, Doubles Down on Phase 1”, 2026-08-12.

Pre-registered prediction P4 · open · registered 2026-09-26Capital follows the law

Capital follows the law

Window: A = the later of two dates: the Royal Assent of Bill C-39 and the Royal Assent of the bill containing the Productivity Mega Deduction; window A to A+12 months. What counts: The claim: Canada's investment gap was a permitting discount, not a geology discount. If so, committed capital rises noticeably within 12 months of A for projects on the investment summit's 167-project list. "Committed" means final investment decisions, signed financing and allocations of funds to specific projects, not announcements. Supported if commitments cluster after Royal Assent and investors cite the law. …

Whether the build-out stalls. If C-39 or the deduction is defeated or gutted, or a flagship project stops, the odds of O2 fall.

Pre-registered prediction P5 · open · registered 2026-09-27Pressure returns if the build-out stalls

Pressure returns if the build-out stalls

Window: Stall event (C-39 defeated/gutted, Mega Deduction withdrawn or cut back, flagship project stops); window 90 days after it becomes public. What counts: The question: if Canada's resource build-out stalls, does US pressure come back within 90 days, timed to the stall? What counts as a hit: in the 90 days after a stall becomes public, the US applies new or renewed pressure on Canada: new tariffs or threats, talks broken off, or a pending deal slowed or reversed. The pressure must be timed to the stall, not to an act of Canadian defiance. A hit supports the foresight …

How long the tariffs last. For Canada's side, nothing matters more. With today's tariffs otherwise kept, a lasting deal that removes a little over a third of today's damage puts Canada ahead in half our model's runs; the tentative deal of August 2026 would have removed about half. The sooner the war ends, the more of the decade's losses come back.

British Columbia after its October 24 election. Most coast-bound capacity, Canada's half of the win and the one thing that can pull barrels away from the US, would be built there. The province's fast-track law is passed but mostly not in force.

Event · 2026-10-24 · action · CA-BCBritish Columbia general election, polling day (scheduled)

British Columbia general election, polling day (scheduled)

Scheduled; result pending. Early polls were split: Angus Reid Institute (online, 2026-09-22 to 24) had the Conservatives at 43% and the NDP at 35% among decided and leaning voters; Liaison Strategies (IVR, 2026-09-21 to 22) had the NDP at 41% and the Conservatives at 36%. In the Angus Reid survey, 15% named US tariffs, Donald Trump or the alcohol ban as a top issue.

Documented by

• Liaison Strategies, “B.C.: NDP Leads Conservatives 41% to 36% as Election Begins”, 2026-09-23.
• Angus Reid Institute, “Ballot Backlash: BC Conservatives open 8-point lead after snap election call, but electorate far from locked in”, 2026-09-24.
• Wikipedia, “2026 British Columbia general election”.

Pre-registered prediction P8 · open · registered 2026-09-27BC Bill 15 switched on within 12 months of the 2026-10-24 election

BC Bill 15 switched on within 12 months of the 2026-10-24 election

Window: 2026-10-24 to 2027-10-24. What counts: The question: within 12 months of the BC election of 24 October 2026 (that is, by 24 October 2027), are the fast-track powers in BC's Bill 15 (sections 1 and 3 to 47) switched on, and are they used? If a Conservative government wins, we record whether it switches Bill 15 on, amends it or repeals it. What counts as a hit: a cabinet order (an order in council) brings sections 1 and 3 to 47 into force by 24 October …

The next big southbound pipeline. South Bow has 20-year commitments from nine shippers for 465,000 barrels a day to the US on its Prairie Connector (South Bow / Bridger, partial Keystone XL revival), with a decision targeted for mid-2027.⁵³

Who buys the second wave. If most of the new coast output lands outside the US while southbound flows stall, that is O1, and the US side of this forecast is wrong. Metals already look partly like that: most new mine output is sold outside the US. Oil and gas are what keep the total above 2024.

We will update both sides when these move, and say why.