What the US nets

What Canada nets counted Canada's side of the ledger and left one line open: what the trade war costs Americans. This piece counts it, on the same simulated futures, against 2024.

Canada's resource build-out pays the US a little; the trade war costs it more. By 2034, the build-out adds about US$1.5 billion a year to Americans' income, mostly US owners' profits from Canadian oil, gas and LNG. The US comes out ahead only if less than about 10% of today's tariff damage is still in place, against about 57% for Canada. If today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did, about a quarter is left, and the US comes out ahead in about 14% of our runs, Canada in 98%.

Tariff damage still in place in 2034	US ahead in 2034, in our model	Typical US result in 2034	Canada ahead	Both countries ahead
None: the trade war is over	78%	+US$1.5 billion a year	100%	78%
10%	50%	US$0.0 billion a year	100%	50%
About a quarter: today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did	14%	-US$2.0 billion a year	98%	14%
Half	0.3%	-US$6.2 billion a year	62%	0.2%
All of it: the tariffs never end	None	-US$13.8 billion a year	9%	None

Over the decade, the US is behind in every run. Added up from 2025 to 2034, the war years leave it typically about US$65 billion behind, and Canada about C$89 billion.

All amounts are in 2024 dollars. The "about a quarter" row lets the share of damage left vary around that average, as in What Canada nets. Even the "all of it" row keeps Canada's counter-tariffs at their own chance of lasting, so Canada's counter-tariffs are not at full force there.

Claim · outcomeCounted as Americans' income, Canada's build-out adds about US$1.5 billion a year by 2034, mostly US owners' profits from Canadian oil, gas and LNG, but the trade war costs more. The US comes out ahead in 2034 only if about a tenth or less of today's tariff damage is still in place (Canada: unless about 57% is), which happens in about 14% of our runs if the tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did. Either way the amount is small for the US, about 0.006% of its economy in 2034. This counts income; the forecast that more Canadian supply reaches the US counts volume.

Counted as Americans' income, Canada's build-out adds about US$1.5 billion a year by 2034, mostly US owners' profits from Canadian oil, gas and LNG, but the trade war costs more. The US comes out ahead in 2034 only if about a tenth or less of today's tariff damage is still in place (Canada: unless about 57% is), which happens in about 14% of our runs if the tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did. Either way the amount is small for the US, about 0.006% of its economy in 2034. This counts income; the forecast that more Canadian supply reaches the US counts volume.

Rests on 5 pieces of evidence

How we count

Americans' income, 2034 against 2024. We count wages, US owners' profits and US government revenue from Canada's build-out, every project whoever decided it, and from the trade war, against no tariffs and no Canadian responses. The 20,000 futures are our Canadian model's, matched one to one: a pipeline built in one future is built on both sides of the ledger.

Money that moves between Americans is left beside the ledger. Duties paid by US buyers go to the US Treasury; the higher prices US metal makers charge behind the tariff stay with US firms; farm aid goes from US taxpayers to US farmers. Each costs someone, and we say whom below, but none makes the country richer or poorer.

Model estimates, not odds. No public figure in 2034 will report what Americans earn from Canada, so we give shares of our runs, not a forecast. The rules were written before the model was run; any change will be dated. One-time amounts are spread over 25 years at the same 7% rate as on Canada's side.

The ledger

Three gains, typical figures for 2034, with today's tariffs fading as past ones did:

• US owners' share of the profits from Canada's added output: US$2.6 billion a year. US-controlled companies earn about three-quarters of the revenue of foreign-controlled oil and gas firms in Canada,¹ and US investors hold about 29% of the shares listed in Canada.²
• US equipment, materials and engineering sold to Canadian projects: about US$0.5 billion a year, spread out. The US makes about 48% of the kinds of capital goods Canada imports for such projects.³
• Lower prices for potash, uranium and metals, which the US imports: about US$0.4 billion, US$0.3 billion and US$0.1 billion a year.

Ksi Lisims shows where US money sits. Its developer, Houston-based Western LNG, is funded mainly by US investors,⁴ so much of its profit would go to the US. LNG Canada's second phase, owned mainly by Asian and European companies, sends little.

ProjectKsi Lisims LNG

Ksi Lisims LNG

lng · goes tidewater · approved · 12.0 Mtpa · BC

Proposed floating LNG export project with capacity of 12 million tonnes a year on Nisga'a Nation land at Pearse Island, BC, co-developed by the Nisga'a Nation, Rockies LNG and Houston-based Western LNG, with gas to come through the proposed Prince Rupert Gas Transmission pipeline. It received its federal and provincial environmental approvals on September 15, 2025 and was referred to the federal Major Projects Office on November 13, 2025; no final investment decision had been taken by late September 2026. Announced buyers total 8 million tonnes a year: Shell (2, sale and purchase agreement finalized January 2024), TotalEnergies (2, May 2025, conditional on the investment decision), Uniper (2, signed July 2026, deliveries from 2032), and non-binding deals with SEFE (1, May 2026) and Santos (1, September 2026). None of the announced buyers is a US company, and Uniper's volumes can go to any destination.

ProjectLNG Canada Phase 2

LNG Canada Phase 2

lng · goes tidewater · under construction · 14.0 Mtpa · BC

Expansion of LNG Canada's export terminal at Kitimat, BC: two more trains add about 14 million tonnes a year, doubling capacity to 28 million tonnes a year. Referred to the Major Projects Office on September 11, 2025. The joint-venture partners (Shell, PETRONAS, PetroChina, Mitsubishi and KOGAS) took the final investment decision on September 29, 2026 (LNG Canada's release is dated September 28), while Bill C-39 was still before Parliament and the Mega Deduction was still a draft proposal. The Prime Minister's Office and the Major Projects Office put the investment at $33 billion; Shell expects commercial operations in the early 2030s. The decision lets five First Nations, through MNT Investments LP, invest up to C$1 billion for a majority stake in the Phase 2 LNG storage tank. TC Energy said Coastal GasLink Phase 2, which adds compressor stations to nearly double the pipeline's capacity, will proceed. Each partner is responsible for taking its own share of the output (equity lifting); the announcements name no third-party buyers for Phase 2 output.

Two minuses inside the gains:

• US refiners pay more for heavy oil: -US$1.1 billion. They buy most western Canadian crude at a discount that has tracked the Alberta price one for one since 2015.⁵ New routes to the coast narrow it, above all Pacific Link, listed in October under the Building Canada Act (One Canadian Economy Act (incl. Building Canada Act) (C-5)) and built in about 29% of our runs. Canada counts the narrowing as its gain; the same dollars are paid by American refiners. In Canadian dollars, refiners pay about C$1.5 billion. Canada's ledger keeps only the Canadian owners' share, typically about C$0.8 billion; roughly the rest goes to foreign owners of Canadian producers, and the American-owned part comes back on the US side as profits.
• Cheaper gas: -US$0.6 billion. The US now exports more gas than it imports, about 16 billion cubic feet a day more in 2025,⁶⁷ so a lower price costs US producers more than it saves US buyers. The buyers' saving, about US$3.3 billion a year, sits beside the ledger.

Event · 2026-10-01 · action · CACarney lists the West Coast oil pipeline, renamed Pacific Link, as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act

Carney lists the West Coast oil pipeline, renamed Pacific Link, as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act

In Fort McMurray on 1 October 2026, Prime Minister Carney listed the West Coast oil pipeline, now called Pacific Link, as a project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act, the first project designated this way (CBC). The pipeline would carry about one million barrels a day roughly 1,250 km from Bruderheim, Alberta, to a deepwater port outside Delta, BC (Global News), on a southern route that the government says protects BC's North Coast and the Great Bear Sea. Canada and Alberta are to hold equal shares, Pembina Pipeline is the private investor and Trans Mountain Corporation leads development; Indigenous communities will be offered at least 10% ownership, financed through loan guarantees. The Major Projects Office is to finalize the conditions by 1 September 2027 (Prime Minister's Office). No final investment decision or in-service date was announced.

Documented by

• Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister Carney lists the West Coast Oil Pipeline, now known as Pacific Link, as a project of national interest”, 2026-10-01.
• Canada Gazette, “Order Amending Schedule 1 to the Building Canada Act, P.C. 2026-925 (Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 160, No. 41)”, 2026-10-10.
• BOE Report (The Canadian Press), “A timeline for Pacific Link, the national interest Alberta-B.C. pipeline plan”, 2026-10-01.

Three costs, at the share of today's damage still in place in 2034:

• US tariffs on Canadian goods: US$2.7 billion a year, about US$12 billion at full force. That is lost output, not the tariff bill: at full force, US buyers would pay about US$21 billion a year in duties on Canadian goods, which go to the Treasury. The loss is what buyers give up by switching to dearer suppliers or going without, plus knock-on costs in supply chains: 16 to 88 cents per dollar of duty, on our reading of five published estimates.^89101112
• Canada's counter-tariffs: US$0.3 billion, about US$3.6 billion at full force, borne by US exporters who sell less or cut their prices. They are less likely to last than the US tariffs, about 40% even where those remain, so the amount in place is full force times the share left times that chance. The newest list, since September 2026, covers about US$20 billion of US goods, about 6% of US exports to Canada.¹³
• Canadians' boycotts: US$0.25 billion, about US$1.1 billion at today's level, from US alcohol taken off provincial shelves and fewer Canadian visitors. We count the income lost, not the sales.

Event · 2025-02-01 · action · USExecutive Order 14193 imposes a 25% tariff on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy, citing "the failure of Canada to do more" on drugs

Executive Order 14193 imposes a 25% tariff on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy, citing "the failure of Canada to do more" on drugs

President Trump signed Executive Order 14193 on 1 February 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The order said "the failure of Canada to do more" to intercept drug traffickers and drugs, fentanyl among them, was an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the United States, and set an additional 25% duty on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy from 4 February. On 3 February the tariffs were paused for 30 days; they took effect on 4 March 2025.

Documented by

• The White House, “Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border”, 2025-02-01.
• Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents (GovInfo), “Executive Order 14193: Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border”, 2025-02-01.
• Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-Canada Relations amid Tariffs Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act”, 2025-04-14.

Event · 2025-06-04 · action · USUS Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum double from 25% to 50% on 4 June 2025 for all countries except the UK

US Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum double from 25% to 50% on 4 June 2025 for all countries except the UK

President Trump's Proclamation 10947, signed on 3 June 2025, raised the Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum and their derivative products from 25% to 50% from 12:01 a.m. on 4 June 2025. Imports from the United Kingdom stayed at 25% under the US-UK trade deal of May 2025, with the rate open to adjustment from 9 July. Canadian steel and aluminum were subject to the full 50%.

Documented by

• Federal Register (Executive Office of the President), “Proclamation 10947: Adjusting Imports of Aluminum and Steel Into the United States”, 2025-06-03.
• Blakes (Blake, Cassels & Graydon), “U.S.–Canada Tariffs: Timeline of Key Dates and Documents”, 2026-09-04.

Law or agreement · US · latest stage: amendedSection 338 proclamations on Canada (Proclamations 11046, 11047, 11048 (Jul 20, 2026); 11056 (Aug 18, 2026); five proclamations of Sep 8, 2026)

Section 338 proclamations on Canada (Proclamations 11046, 11047, 11048 (Jul 20, 2026); 11056 (Aug 18, 2026); five proclamations of Sep 8, 2026)

announced 2026-07-20 → in force 2026-08-22 → amended 2026-09-08 → amended 2026-10-23

The first express use of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose tariffs. Three proclamations of 20 July 2026 set 50% tariffs on Canadian goods, citing Canada's treatment of US alcohol, dairy and motor vehicles; goods that qualify under USMCA are not exempt. The tariffs were due on 19 August; Proclamation 11056 of 18 August suspended them until the end of 21 August, and they took effect on 22 August. Five proclamations of 8 September 2026 changed the product lists from 15 September and banned some imports from 29 September. A proclamation of 23 October changed the motor-vehicle list again from 30 October, removing 22 tariff lines and adding 100, with the 50% rate unchanged. The White House fact sheet gives no dollar figure for the goods covered; Global Trade Alert puts them at US$17.7 billion, and Canada's Department of Finance at $27.6 billion (Canadian).

Event · 2026-09-08 · action · CACanadian counter-tariffs take effect on C$27.6B of US goods (about US$20B), matching the US Section 338 tariffs

Canadian counter-tariffs take effect on C$27.6B of US goods (about US$20B), matching the US Section 338 tariffs

From 12:01 a.m. on 2026-09-08, Canada applied counter-tariffs of 15%, 25% and 50% to a list of C$27.6 billion of US goods (about US$20 billion, per the Congressional Research Service), including steel, dairy, appliances, farm equipment, pulp and paper, and electronics. Finance Canada said the list matches the US Section 338 tariffs 'dollar for dollar'; CRS describes it as 'dollar for dollar, rate for rate'.

Documented by

• Department of Finance Canada, “List of products from the United States subject to counter-tariffs effective September 8, 2026”, 2026-08-26.
• Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930”, 2026-09-14.
• Blakes (Blake, Cassels & Graydon), “U.S.–Canada Tariffs: Timeline of Key Dates and Documents”, 2026-09-04.

Typical figures don't simply add: the lines move together, so the net, typically -US$2.0 billion a year, is worked out run by run.

Why the US breaks even so early

Its gains are thin; its losses grow with the tariffs. A barrel bought at the market price makes no American richer, so only profits and price effects count, and the largest price effect works against US refiners. If the tariffs never end, the US is typically US$13.8 billion a year behind, so about 10% of today's damage cancels its gain. Canada's gains are far larger, about C$23 billion a year once the trade war is over, so it breaks even only when about 57% of the damage remains.

The decade

The US is behind in every run. Its typical result is negative in every year from 2025 to 2034, at worst about US$11 billion in 2027. Added up, it is typically US$65 billion behind; in one run in ten, more than US$91 billion.

Even an early peace leaves a gap. Had the trade war ended at the end of 2026, the US would still be typically about US$7 billion behind over the decade, and ahead in only about a fifth of our runs. Ending in 2028 leaves it about US$38 billion behind; never ending, about US$128 billion. These figures assume the US damage stops the day the tariffs do.

Small for the US, large for Canada

For the US, the net is tiny. The typical result, US$2.0 billion behind, is about 0.006% of the US economy in 2034;¹⁴¹⁵ even if the tariffs never end, about 0.04%. Canada's typical C$14 billion gain is about 0.4% of its economy in 2034.¹⁶

Inside the US, the costs land on particular people. Midwest refineries take about three-quarters of the heavy Canadian crude the US imports,¹⁷ so most of the heavy-oil cost is theirs. US buyers of tariffed goods would pay about US$23 billion a year at full force, in duties and in higher prices for US-made metal and lumber. Across all 2025 US tariffs, the New York Fed found US importers bore 94% of the cost through August, 86% by November.¹⁸

Others lost sales. US spirits exports to Canada fell 70% from March to December 2025, and wine exports 78% over the year.¹⁹²⁰ US travel services sold to Canadians were about US$3.7 billion lower in 2025 than in 2024;²¹ the Statistics Canada card below measures Canadians' spending on US trips (C$3.3 billion less), a different measure from a different agency. Washington's US$12.6 billion in aid for 2025 crops does not name Canada; we put the part tied to Canada's counter-tariffs at about US$0.3 billion, once.²²²³

Event · 2025-03-04 · action · CAProvincial liquor boards, including Ontario's LCBO and Quebec's SAQ, pull US alcohol from their shelves

Provincial liquor boards, including Ontario's LCBO and Quebec's SAQ, pull US alcohol from their shelves

On 4 March 2025, the day US tariffs on Canada took effect, Ontario's LCBO began removing more than 3,600 US alcohol products, and the SAQ, at the Quebec government's request, began withdrawing all US products and stopped importing them. In July 2026 the White House cited provincial halts on purchases of US alcohol as one ground for its Section 338 tariffs on Canada.

Documented by

• SAQ (Société des alcools du Québec), “Retrait des produits des États-Unis de la SAQ”, 2025-03-04.
• The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Additional Tariffs on Canada”, 2026-07-20.
• CP24, “Ontario removing U.S. alcohol from LCBO as 'first round of retaliation' against Trump's tariffs”, 2025-03-04.

Chart · US$ million

How to read this: One bar per period, starting at zero, so heights compare directly. Series are grouped side by side within each period, in legend order. Hover a point or bar for its exact period and value.

Source

• Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, “2025 DISCUS American Spirits Exports Report”, 2026-03-31.
• Wine Institute, “Canada Bans Cut U.S. Wine Exports 78% in 2025”, 2026-03-04.

Event · 2026-07-22 · document · CAStatCan: Canadian-resident return trips from the US fell 25.4% in 2025, and spending on US visits fell C$3.3B to C$18.8B

StatCan: Canadian-resident return trips from the US fell 25.4% in 2025, and spending on US visits fell C$3.3B to C$18.8B

Statistics Canada reported on 22 July 2026, in a year-in-review article, that total Canadian-resident return border crossings from the United States (all modes) fell 25.4% in 2025 from 2024, bottoming out in July 2025 at nearly one-third below a year earlier, and that spending on visits to the United States fell by $3.3 billion to $18.8 billion in 2025. In August 2026, Canadian-resident return trips from the United States by automobile were up 9.9% from August 2025 but still 27.4% below August 2024, and trips by air were 22.7% below August 2024 (The Daily, 11 September 2026).

Documented by

• Statistics Canada, “Canadian-resident travel to the United States: A year in review (Economic and Social Reports 36-28-0001)”, 2026-07-22.
• Statistics Canada, “The Daily: Leading indicator of international arrivals to Canada, August 2026”, 2026-09-11.

The winners are particular too: US owners of Canadian oil, gas and LNG, US equipment makers, US gas buyers, the US metal producers sheltered by the tariffs, and the Treasury. Who pays covers the Canadian side.

What could change it

Four inputs move the result most, each moved alone, with today's tariffs fading as past ones did:

• The heavy-oil transfer. If US refiners could buy other heavy crude at the same price, the US would come out ahead in just under half our runs, about 49%.
• What the tariffs cost. At the Congressional Budget Office's own ratio, which includes retaliation and uncertainty, about 3%; at a simple sector-by-sector estimate, about 22%.
• US ownership. At the high end of its range, about 28%; at the low end, about 5%.
• How long the tariffs last, the least knowable input. If they fade as fast as Canada's own past cases, about 57%; as slowly as the record before 2025 suggests, about 2%.

Event · 2026-02-24 · action · USIEEPA tariffs stop being collected and a temporary 10% global surcharge under Section 122 takes effect

IEEPA tariffs stop being collected and a temporary 10% global surcharge under Section 122 takes effect

Executive Order 14389, 'Ending Certain Tariff Actions', signed Feb 20, 2026 after the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs, ended those duties; they were no longer collected on goods entered from 12:00 a.m. ET on Feb 24. The same day a temporary 10% import surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 took effect for up to 150 days. Goods qualifying under CUSMA are exempt.

Documented by

• Federal Register, “Executive Order 14389 of February 20, 2026: Ending Certain Tariff Actions (91 FR 9437)”, 2026-02-25.
• GHY International, “U.S. 10% Section 122 Tariff In Effect Feb. 24; IEEPA Tariffs Cease; De Minimis Suspension Continues”, 2026-02-24.
• Blakes (Blake, Cassels & Graydon), “U.S.–Canada Tariffs: Timeline of Key Dates and Documents”, 2026-09-04.

What this means for "both sides win"

Our forecast counts the US side by supply: about 85% that more Canadian resources reach the US, still a forecast with odds. Counted as income, the same barrels are worth far less to the US.

Half of what we expect holds on both sides: the build-out pays for both countries; the trade war costs both. The other half, that the US gets more either way, holds for supply, not as a net gain. On the expected course, Canada likely comes out ahead of 2024 by 2034 and the US likely a little behind, and over the decade both are behind.

Claim · outcomeOn the current course, intended or not, Canada's resource build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more supply, and the new southbound capacity arrives first, from 2027: it gets more supply either way; counted as income, the build-out pays it a little, but the trade war costs it more, so it comes out ahead in 2034 only if nearly all of today's tariff damage is gone. Canada gets a bigger resource base and the capacity to sell elsewhere, which shifts bargaining power toward it. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.

On the current course, intended or not, Canada's resource build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more supply, and the new southbound capacity arrives first, from 2027: it gets more supply either way; counted as income, the build-out pays it a little, but the trade war costs it more, so it comes out ahead in 2034 only if nearly all of today's tariff damage is gone. Canada gets a bigger resource base and the capacity to sell elsewhere, which shifts bargaining power toward it. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.

Rests on 10 pieces of evidence

We track duties on Canadian goods, the heavy-oil discount, US stakes in new projects and official estimates of the tariffs' cost, and will rerun both models when the tariffs change, a deal is struck or a project changes stage.