Who wins, who pays, part 7

What Canada nets

Our forecast's 81% for 'both sides win' counted only the US side. Counting Canada's: by 2034 it comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place, but the decade as a whole leaves it behind.

By W.F.Published Updated 21 min readSources and method

Updated since publication: 1 correction, 3 updates

Also in French: Le bilan net du Canada

Correction. When we published this piece, we said that on a narrower question, whether the course Canada took since January 2025 paid for itself, setting aside projects decided before then, our model gave Canada ahead in about 64% of its runs. Our forecast now takes the odds that approved and postponed projects get built from the record of past Canadian projects instead of our judgment, and on that narrower question Canada now comes out behind in most runs. The main count, 2034 against 2024 counting everything, still has Canada ahead unless most of today's tariff damage is still in place, and the decade still leaves it behind. Other figures moved too; the corrections log has the old wording.

When we published our forecast that both Canada and the United States come out ahead by 2034, we put about 81% on it. That figure measured one side only: whether more Canadian resources reach the US. This piece adds Canada's side: what it gains from its resources against what the trade war costs it.

Canada comes out ahead if its resource gains since 2024 outweigh what the tariffs cost it. For 2034, that turns on one thing: how much of today's tariff damage is still in place. Canada comes out ahead unless about 57% of it is. If today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did, about a quarter is left, and our model gives Canada ahead in 98% of its runs, typically by C$14 billion a year. If they never end, about 9%.

But 2034 is not the whole story. Added up over the decade from 2025 to 2034, the war years leave Canada behind in 95% of our runs, typically by about C$89 billion. The longer the tariffs last, the less of that comes back.

Tariff damage still in place in 2034 Canada ahead in 2034, in our model Typical result in 2034 Both sides: more reaches the US and Canada ahead
None: the trade war is over 100% +C$23 billion a year About 85%
About a quarter: today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did 98% +C$14 billion a year About 83%
40% 82% +C$7 billion a year About 68%
Half 62% +C$3 billion a year About 50%
Three-quarters 26% -C$7 billion a year About 19%
All of it: the tariffs never end 9% -C$17 billion a year About 7%
If the trade war ends Canada's total over 2025 to 2034, typical, not discounted Canada behind over the decade
At the end of 2026 +C$15 billion In 34% of our runs
At the end of 2028 -C$77 billion In 94%
Gradually, the way past US tariffs did -C$89 billion In 95%
Never -C$264 billion In all of them

All amounts are in 2024 dollars. The first table fixes the share of damage left at each level; the cases in the text let it vary around an average, so their figures differ slightly from the nearest row. The US side: about 85% that clearly more Canadian resources reach the US in 2034 than in 2024 (our volume model, unchanged). That is a forecast with odds. Canada's side is shown as our model's estimates by tariff condition, because no public figure in 2034 will settle it: the tariff damage will still be an estimate.

How we count

2034 against 2024, counting everything. We compare Canadians' income from resources in 2034 with 2024, whoever decided each project and whenever, so Trans Mountain's expanded line and LNG Canada's first phase count in full. Against that we set what the tariffs cost Canada compared with no tariffs, as the budget officer, the Bank of Canada and Finance estimate it. The build-out is the gain; the tariffs are the loss.

A narrower question gives the opposite answer: asked only whether the course Canada took since January 2025 paid for itself, setting aside projects decided before then, our model gives Canada behind in most of its runs: ahead in only about 44%, typically about C$1.0 billion a year behind.

Canadians' income, not sales. We count wages, the profits of Canadian owners (companies, shareholders, governments and First Nations) and what governments collect, not profits that go abroad. The tariff damage is measured as lost output; checked on the same income basis as the gains, the difference is negligible.

Rules first. The model's rules are written down and published, and any change to them is dated. We use this measure because it answers the question a Canadian asks: can the country pull through? One-time amounts are spread over 25 years at the 7% rate Ottawa uses.1 The model runs 20,000 times, picking each uncertain input from its sourced range; the typical result is the middle run.

The ledger

Four gains and four costs, each the typical figure for 2034, with today's tariffs fading the way past US tariffs did:

  • Income from resource output added since 2024, mostly oil, gas, metals, potash and uranium: about C$19.6 billion a year.
  • Better prices from selling elsewhere, mainly a narrower discount on western oil: C$1.3 billion.
  • Canadians' share of new and expanded pipelines and LNG plants, First Nations' stakes included: C$3.3 billion.
  • Construction spending since 2025 that stays in Canada as wages and suppliers' income: about C$39 billion in all, or C$3.4 billion a year spread out.
  • Against them: tariff damage at the share still in force in 2034 (C$9.1 billion); counter-tariffs Canadians pay on US goods (C$0.2 billion); public money at its expected loss (C$3.3 billion); and tax breaks (C$1.0 billion).

Typical figures don't simply add. The lines move together: the runs that build the big pipelines raise several gains at once, so each line's typical figure comes from a different run. We work out the net run by run instead; its typical value, C$13.9 billion a year, is the figure we use throughout.

Event · 2026-09-08 · action · CACanadian counter-tariffs take effect on C$27.6B of US goods (about US$20B), matching the US Section 338 tariffs
Canadian counter-tariffs take effect on C$27.6B of US goods (about US$20B), matching the US Section 338 tariffs

From 12:01 a.m. on 2026-09-08, Canada applied counter-tariffs of 15%, 25% and 50% to a list of C$27.6 billion of US goods (about US$20 billion, per the Congressional Research Service), including steel, dairy, appliances, farm equipment, pulp and paper, and electronics. Finance Canada said the list matches the US Section 338 tariffs 'dollar for dollar'; CRS describes it as 'dollar for dollar, rate for rate'.

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Pacific Link is the biggest bet. The oil pipeline to the BC coast, listed in October under the Building Canada Act (One Canadian Economy Act (incl. Building Canada Act) (C-5)), is built in about 29% of our runs; when it is, building it leaves about C$26 billion of income in Canada. Ottawa and Alberta are to own it with Pembina, and Indigenous communities are to be offered at least 10%;2 the governments' stake counts as public money, so no dollar is counted twice.

ProjectPacific Link (West Coast oil pipeline)
Pacific Link (West Coast oil pipeline)
oil · goes tidewater · listed · 1,000 kb/d · in service 2034 · AB/BC

Proposed pipeline of about 1,250 km, now called Pacific Link, that would carry about one million barrels a day of crude oil, mainly diluted bitumen, from Bruderheim, Alberta, to a deepwater port outside Delta, BC, largely along the Trans Mountain corridor, for export mainly to Asia. Canada and Alberta are to own equal shares, Pembina Pipeline is the private investor, Trans Mountain Corporation leads development, and Indigenous communities are to be offered at least 10% ownership, financed with loan guarantees. The estimated cost is $35.2 billion to $43.7 billion. Referred to the federal Major Projects Office on July 2, 2026, it was listed on October 1, 2026 as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act; the Major Projects Office is to finalize its conditions by September 1, 2027. There is no final investment decision; construction could start as early as 2027, with oil flowing by 2034.

Event · 2026-10-01 · action · CACarney lists the West Coast oil pipeline, renamed Pacific Link, as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act
Carney lists the West Coast oil pipeline, renamed Pacific Link, as the first project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act

In Fort McMurray on 1 October 2026, Prime Minister Carney listed the West Coast oil pipeline, now called Pacific Link, as a project of national interest under Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act, the first project designated this way (CBC). The pipeline would carry about one million barrels a day roughly 1,250 km from Bruderheim, Alberta, to a deepwater port outside Delta, BC (Global News), on a southern route that the government says protects BC's North Coast and the Great Bear Sea. Canada and Alberta are to hold equal shares, Pembina Pipeline is the private investor and Trans Mountain Corporation leads development; Indigenous communities will be offered at least 10% ownership, financed through loan guarantees. The Major Projects Office is to finalize the conditions by 1 September 2027 (Prime Minister's Office). No final investment decision or in-service date was announced.

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LNG Canada's second phase shows the gap between sales and income. Its C$33 billion investment3 leaves about C$13 billion of Canadian income while it is built, but its five owners are all foreign companies,4 so most of its profit leaves. Ksi Lisims LNG, built in about a quarter of our runs, keeps more at home: its supply pipeline is co-owned by the Nisga'a Nation.5

ProjectLNG Canada Phase 2
LNG Canada Phase 2
lng · goes tidewater · under construction · 14.0 Mtpa · BC

Expansion of LNG Canada's export terminal at Kitimat, BC: two more trains add about 14 million tonnes a year, doubling capacity to 28 million tonnes a year. Referred to the Major Projects Office on September 11, 2025. The joint-venture partners (Shell, PETRONAS, PetroChina, Mitsubishi and KOGAS) took the final investment decision on September 29, 2026 (LNG Canada's release is dated September 28), while Bill C-39 was still before Parliament and the Mega Deduction was still a draft proposal. The Prime Minister's Office and the Major Projects Office put the investment at $33 billion; Shell expects commercial operations in the early 2030s. The decision lets five First Nations, through MNT Investments LP, invest up to C$1 billion for a majority stake in the Phase 2 LNG storage tank. TC Energy said Coastal GasLink Phase 2, which adds compressor stations to nearly double the pipeline's capacity, will proceed. Each partner is responsible for taking its own share of the output (equity lifting); the announcements name no third-party buyers for Phase 2 output.

Event · 2026-09-29 · action · CA-BCLNG Canada's partners take the final investment decision on Phase 2, to double the Kitimat plant's capacity to 28 million tonnes a year
LNG Canada's partners take the final investment decision on Phase 2, to double the Kitimat plant's capacity to 28 million tonnes a year

LNG Canada announced that its five joint-venture partners, Shell (40%), PETRONAS (25%), PetroChina (15%), Mitsubishi Corporation (15%) and KOGAS (5%), had taken the final investment decision on the Phase 2 expansion of its plant at Kitimat, BC. LNG Canada's release is dated 28 September 2026; the Prime Minister's Office, Shell and TC Energy announced the decision on 29 September. Phase 2 adds two LNG processing units (trains), raising the plant's capacity from 14 to 28 million tonnes a year; Shell said commercial operations are expected to begin in the early 2030s. The Prime Minister's Office and the federal Major Projects Office put the investment at $33 billion, and the Prime Minister's Office, in the title of its release, called it the second-largest single private investment in Canadian history; LNG Canada described it as one of the largest private-sector investments in Canada. The decision lets MNT Investments LP, representing the Gitga'at, Gitxaała, Haisla, Kitselas and Kitsumkalum Nations, exercise an option to invest up to C$1 billion in a special-purpose entity that will buy Phase 2's new LNG storage tank; the Prime Minister's Office and the Major Projects Office describe this as a majority ownership stake in the tank but give different sizes for it (225,000 cubic metres in the Prime Minister's Office release, 255,000 on the Major Projects Office page). Each partner remains responsible for taking its own share of the LNG produced (equity lifting); the releases name no third-party buyers. TC Energy said the decision met the conditions of its earlier conditional investment decision on Coastal GasLink Phase 2, which adds compressor stations (five, according to LNG Canada) to nearly double the pipeline's current capacity of about 2.1 billion cubic feet a day; the Prime Minister's Office says the capacity will double. TC Energy expects construction to start in early 2027 and service to begin in the early 2030s.

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What we leave at zero. The largest gap is Trans Mountain's effect on the price of western oil: the discount narrowed when the line opened, but the industry expects it to widen again as the line fills, so we count no further gain. If it held, Canada would gain up to about C$2.5 billion a year more.

Emissions sit beside the ledger, not in it. The build-out adds about 32 million tonnes of greenhouse gases a year by 2034. At Ottawa's social cost of carbon, which values harm worldwide,6 that is about C$11 billion a year; subtracted, with today's tariffs fading the way past ones did, Canada comes out ahead in about 70% of our runs. The ledger measures Canadians' income, not whether the projects are good for Canada overall.

If the trade war is over by 2034

Canada comes out ahead in virtually all our runs, typically by C$23.2 billion a year; in 80% of them the gain is between C$16 billion and C$39 billion.

The public purse comes out ahead. Royalties and taxes from the new output exceed the public money at risk and the tax breaks, by about C$3.4 billion a year.

If the trade war isn't over by 2034

At full strength, the tariff damage outweighs the gains. The budget officer puts the long-run loss from today's trade policies at 0.9% of Canada's output by 2030.7 On the 2034 economy, with the newest 50% tariffs and the counter-tariffs added, that is about C$44 billion a year at the median, against about C$27 billion of gains (typical figures, which don't simply add). The damage outweighs the gains in 87% of our runs.

Event · 2025-02-01 · action · USExecutive Order 14193 imposes a 25% tariff on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy, citing "the failure of Canada to do more" on drugs
Executive Order 14193 imposes a 25% tariff on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy, citing "the failure of Canada to do more" on drugs

President Trump signed Executive Order 14193 on 1 February 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The order said "the failure of Canada to do more" to intercept drug traffickers and drugs, fentanyl among them, was an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the United States, and set an additional 25% duty on Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy from 4 February. On 3 February the tariffs were paused for 30 days; they took effect on 4 March 2025.

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Event · 2025-06-04 · action · USUS Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum double from 25% to 50% on 4 June 2025 for all countries except the UK
US Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum double from 25% to 50% on 4 June 2025 for all countries except the UK

President Trump's Proclamation 10947, signed on 3 June 2025, raised the Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum and their derivative products from 25% to 50% from 12:01 a.m. on 4 June 2025. Imports from the United Kingdom stayed at 25% under the US-UK trade deal of May 2025, with the rate open to adjustment from 9 July. Canadian steel and aluminum were subject to the full 50%.

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Law or agreement · US · latest stage: amendedSection 338 proclamations on Canada (Proclamations 11046, 11047, 11048 (Jul 20, 2026); 11056 (Aug 18, 2026); five proclamations of Sep 8, 2026)
Section 338 proclamations on Canada (Proclamations 11046, 11047, 11048 (Jul 20, 2026); 11056 (Aug 18, 2026); five proclamations of Sep 8, 2026)
announced 2026-07-20 → in force 2026-08-22 → amended 2026-09-08 → amended 2026-10-23

The first express use of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose tariffs. Three proclamations of 20 July 2026 set 50% tariffs on Canadian goods, citing Canada's treatment of US alcohol, dairy and motor vehicles; goods that qualify under USMCA are not exempt. The tariffs were due on 19 August; Proclamation 11056 of 18 August suspended them until the end of 21 August, and they took effect on 22 August. Five proclamations of 8 September 2026 changed the product lists from 15 September and banned some imports from 29 September. A proclamation of 23 October changed the motor-vehicle list again from 30 October, removing 22 tariff lines and adding 100, with the 50% rate unchanged. The White House fact sheet gives no dollar figure for the goods covered; Global Trade Alert puts them at US$17.7 billion, and Canada's Department of Finance at $27.6 billion (Canadian).

So the question is how long the tariffs last. We counted 63 US tariff cases since 1971 against allies and large trading partners, each covering at least US$1 billion of trade. Tariffs imposed as leverage ended fastest, half gone in under three years; protective tariffs took a little longer; anti-dumping duties almost never end. Today's tariffs on Canada are about half leverage, half protection.

Canada's own record is mixed. The 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs were lifted for Canada within a year.8 Lumber duties imposed in 2001 ended only in 2006, after the US had collected about US$5.3 billion,9 and today's, about 25% combined since the latest annual review, have run since 2017.101112 In February 2026, a Supreme Court ruling ended the emergency tariffs, but a lower stand-in replaced them within days.

Event · 2026-02-24 · action · USIEEPA tariffs stop being collected and a temporary 10% global surcharge under Section 122 takes effect
IEEPA tariffs stop being collected and a temporary 10% global surcharge under Section 122 takes effect

Executive Order 14389, 'Ending Certain Tariff Actions', signed Feb 20, 2026 after the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs, ended those duties; they were no longer collected on goods entered from 12:00 a.m. ET on Feb 24. The same day a temporary 10% import surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 took effect for up to 150 days. Goods qualifying under CUSMA are exempt.

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If today's tariffs fade the way past ones did, about a quarter of the damage is still in place in 2034, and Canada comes out ahead in 98% of our runs, typically by C$13.9 billion a year.

Why it's a range. Much of the record's speed comes from 2025 and 2026, when Washington cut tariffs for other partners, mostly by deal. Canada got no such deal. Leave those two years out, or count partial cuts as no end at all, and about 40% of the damage is still in place in 2034; Canada then comes out ahead in about 80% to 81% of our runs, typically by C$8 billion. Other readings of that history go higher, up to nearly 100%.

Official forecasters assume no end. The budget officer, the Bank of Canada and Finance's survey of private forecasters treat today's tariffs as lasting through their forecasts,1314 a working assumption, not a forecast. On it, Canada comes out ahead in only about 9% of our runs, typically about C$17 billion a year behind.

Event · 2026-06-04 · document · CAPBO's June 2026 Economic and Fiscal Outlook treats current US tariffs as permanent and projects growth of 1.1% in 2026 and 1.6% in 2027
PBO's June 2026 Economic and Fiscal Outlook treats current US tariffs as permanent and projects growth of 1.1% in 2026 and 1.6% in 2027

The Parliamentary Budget Officer published its Economic and Fiscal Outlook on 4 June 2026. Assuming that the US tariffs and Canadian countermeasures in place as of May 2026 persist, it projected real GDP growth of 1.1% in 2026 and 1.6% in 2027, down from 1.3% and 1.8% in its September 2025 outlook, and said business investment continues to lag as firms postpone expansion plans. It projected federal deficits averaging about $64 billion a year over the next five years, declining to $58.2 billion by 2030-31. The PBO said higher nominal GDP reflects elevated commodity prices rather than stronger real economic activity.

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What deal flips it

The damage moves roughly in step with the average tariff rate, which the Bank of Canada puts at 5.0% on Canadian goods.15 With today's tariffs otherwise kept, a lasting deal that removes about 45% of today's damage puts Canada ahead in half our runs.

The tentative deal of August 2026 would have removed about half the damage. As reported, the US was to cut its tariff on Canadian steel and aluminum from 50% to 25%, and on autos from 25% to 15%, with US-made content exempt.16 Canada would then come out ahead in about 57% of our runs. The talks collapsed days later.

Event · 2026-08-18 · action · USTrump announces a tentative deal with Canada, 'subject to the finalization of documents', and suspends the Section 338 tariffs until the end of 21 August
Trump announces a tentative deal with Canada, 'subject to the finalization of documents', and suspends the Section 338 tariffs until the end of 21 August

Less than two hours before new 50% US tariffs on about $20 billion worth of Canadian goods under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 were due to take effect, President Trump posted on Truth Social at 10:15 p.m. ET on 18 August 2026 that he would pause them for three days, "based on the fact that Canada and the U.S.A., subject to the finalization of documents, have a DEAL!" (CNBC). He signed a proclamation the same day suspending the tariffs, the Congressional Research Service reported. Prime Minister Carney said in a statement that night: "Substantial progress has been made, although there is important work still to be done," and that the US had agreed to postpone the tariffs "until end of day, August 21." No deal was concluded, and the tariffs took effect on 22 August (CRS).

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Event · 2026-08-21 · statement · CACarney walks away from the tentative deal after late US demands on autos, culture and Canada's other trade deals
Carney walks away from the tentative deal after late US demands on autos, culture and Canada's other trade deals

Caution: self-reported The late US demands are described in Carney's own account; US Trade Representative Greer blamed new Canadian demands instead. The precise terms of the final US offer are not public. Only one side’s own account of itself.

Talks on the tentative Canada-US deal unravelled on the evening of Friday 21 August 2026, and Prime Minister Carney announced early on Saturday 22 August that he had told Canada's negotiators to walk away; the US 50% tariffs took effect at 12:01 a.m. that day, CBC News reported. Carney said the US had added late demands on autos, including exempting some vehicles from tariffs but not others, on Canada's support for French-language culture and media and on bilingual labelling, and, "in the last hours," language to restrict Canada's ability to have other trade deals. "We cannot accept what they've offered, and we will not give what they've asked," he said.

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A better deal would settle it: duty-free quotas covering three-quarters of 2024 trade in the hit sectors, with autos exempt, remove about 85% of the damage and put Canada ahead in virtually all our runs. A flat 10% on all Canadian goods would be worse than today. These are scenarios, not forecasts: we don't estimate the chance of any deal.

The war years

The decade is a different count. The tariff damage peaked at about C$47 billion in 2026, and Canada's yearly net, war costs included, turns positive only around 2031. Added up from 2025 to 2034, Canada is behind in 95% of our runs, typically by about C$89 billion. Only an end to the war by the end of 2026 would leave the decade ahead in most runs.

Repaying them takes years, or never happens. As an illustration, not a forecast: if the war ended in 2026 and the damage faded as the Bank of Canada's de-escalation scenario suggests,13 the typical run would repay the war years by 2036, counting later years for less at the same 7% rate; if it ended in 2028, by 2054; if the tariffs lasted to 2034, most runs never would. The Bank expects some capital to be "written off or diverted toward a less profitable use".17

What this means for "both sides win"

Our forecast's 81% counted only the US side, whether more Canadian resources reach the US; the forecast itself said Canada's costs were still to be counted. We have logged a correction. The forecast keeps its name and its original statement.

Counting the US side by supply (more Canadian resources reaching it) and Canada's by income, it comes out about the same, around 83%, if today's tariffs fade the way past US tariffs did, and about 7% if they never end. Either way, the war years leave Canada behind over the decade.

Claim · outcomeOn the current course, intended or not, Canada's resource build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more supply, and the new southbound capacity arrives first, from 2027: it gets more supply either way; counted as income, the build-out pays it a little, but the trade war costs it more, so it comes out ahead in 2034 only if nearly all of today's tariff damage is gone. Canada gets a bigger resource base and the capacity to sell elsewhere, which shifts bargaining power toward it. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.
On the current course, intended or not, Canada's resource build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more supply, and the new southbound capacity arrives first, from 2027: it gets more supply either way; counted as income, the build-out pays it a little, but the trade war costs it more, so it comes out ahead in 2034 only if nearly all of today's tariff damage is gone. Canada gets a bigger resource base and the capacity to sell elsewhere, which shifts bargaining power toward it. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.
Rests on 10 pieces of evidence

What we now expect: the build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more Canadian supply either way; counted as income, the trade war costs Americans more than the build-out adds. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.

This is a national total: it answers whether the country can pull through, not whose livelihood carries the cost. Who pays answers that. We will rerun the model when the tariffs change, when a deal is struck or when a project changes stage.

Sources

  1. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Canada's Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide for Regulatory Proposals”. ↩
  2. Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister Carney lists the West Coast Oil Pipeline, now known as Pacific Link, as a project of national interest”, 2026-10-01. ↩
  3. Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Carney welcomes LNG Canada Phase 2, the second-largest single private investment in Canadian history”, 2026-09-29. ↩
  4. LNG Canada (via Cision Newswire), “LNG Canada Announces Phase 2 Final Investment Decision”, 2026-09-29. ↩
  5. Western LNG, “Significant investment in Western LNG funds Ksi Lisims LNG and PRGT projects to FID”, 2025-01-14. ↩
  6. Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Estimates - Interim Updated Guidance for the Government of Canada”, 2023-04-20. ↩
  7. Parliamentary Budget Officer, “Economic and Fiscal Outlook – June 2026”, 2026-06-04. ↩
  8. Federal Register (Executive Office of the President), “Proclamation 9893: Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States”, 2019-05-19. ↩
  9. Congressional Research Service, “Softwood Lumber Imports from Canada: Current Issues (R42789)”, 2018-04-12. ↩
  10. Global Affairs Canada, “Frequently asked questions: Softwood lumber”, 2026-08-05. ↩
  11. Federal Register (US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration), “Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of Administrative Review, and Final Determination of No Shipments; 2024 (91 FR 66087, FR Doc. 2026-21296)”, 2026-10-19. ↩
  12. Federal Register (US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration), “Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2024 (91 FR 66092, FR Doc. 2026-21286)”, 2026-10-19. ↩
  13. Bank of Canada, “Monetary Policy Report, July 2025”, 2025-07-30. ↩ ↩
  14. Department of Finance Canada, “Spring Economic Update 2026, Annex 1: Details of economic and fiscal projections”, 2026-04-28. ↩
  15. Bank of Canada, “Monetary Policy Report, July 2026 (full report)”, 2026-07-15. ↩
  16. CBC, “What we know about how the Canada-U.S. trade talks fell apart”, 2026-08-24. ↩
  17. Bank of Canada, “Monetary Policy Report, October 2025”, 2025-10-29. ↩

Changes since publication

A correction fixes something that was wrong. An update records the world moving: odds revised, a prediction settled, data refreshed. Newest first.

The charts, odds tables and other records embedded in this article always show the current data, so some figures may differ from the day it was published. This list records what changed since then.

  1. UpdateThis article

    Text of the article

    Why: Updated after What the US nets, our count of Americans' income from Canada's build-out and the trade war: the US side is now counted.

    In the corrections log

  2. UpdateOn the current course, intended or not, Canada's resource build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more supply, and the new …

    Text
    Text fr

    Why: Updated after What the US nets, our count of Americans' income from Canada's build-out and the trade war: the US side is now counted.

    In the corrections log

  3. CorrectionThis article

    Text of the article
    Summary

    Why: Model figures follow the new official run of the resource-exports model (O2 v1.4, run 63). Rule change (O2 rules amendment 3): the odds that approved and postponed projects get built now come from our study of past Canadian resource and energy projects (share in service within eight years, projects since 2014: 29.3% and 4.3%), under the adoption rule the study fixed before any data were seen; listed and referred projects take the approved odds; Correction notice added and the narrower lens reworded: under rules amendment 3 of our resource-exports model (O2 v1.4, official run 63), the odds that approved and postponed projects get built come from our study of past Canadian resource and energy projects, and Canada's net ledger was rerun on it (CA1, official run 65, CA rules amendment 2, which pairs its build draws with O2's). On the narrower question (the course since January 2025, projects decided before then set aside), Canada goes from ahead in 64% of runs, typically by C$2.9 billion a year, to ahead in 44%, typically C$1.0 billion a year behind. Typed figures turned into model figures: Pacific Link built in about 40% of runs -> 29%; a deal removing a little over a third of the damage -> about 45% to put Canada ahead in half the runs; Model figures follow the new official run of Canada's net ledger (CA1, run 65; CA rules amendment 2, which pairs its build draws with O2's), which reads the resource-exports model (O2 v1.4, run 63). Rule change (O2 rules amendment 3): the odds that approved and postponed projects get built now come from our study of past Canadian resource and energy projects (share in service within eight years, projects since 2014: 29.3% and 4.3%), under the adoption rule the study fixed before any data were seen; listed and referred projects take the approved odds

    In the corrections log

  4. UpdateThis article

    Text of the article

    Why: From 19 October, the final results of the seventh annual US reviews of softwood lumber (Federal Register, 91 FR 66087 and 66092) set the combined anti-dumping and countervailing duties for most Canadian exporters at 24.75%, down from 35.16%; the lumber duties are now given as about 25%, no longer about 35%.

    In the corrections log