Event26 June 2025Action

Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, including the Building Canada Act for national-interest projects, receives Royal Assent

Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act, received Royal Assent on 26 June 2025, less than three weeks after it was introduced on 6 June. It enacted two laws: the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act, which removes federal barriers to trade and labour mobility between provinces, and the Building Canada Act, which came into force the same day. The Building Canada Act lets cabinet list projects it considers in the national interest; for those projects, the findings needed for federal approvals are deemed to be made in the project's favour, the minister can issue a single document that stands for the specified federal authorizations, and cabinet can by regulation exempt them from provisions of the federal laws listed in the Act. The government said a new Major Projects Office would lead the work.

Date: 26 June 2025
Kind: Legislation
Where: Canada
Evidence: Action: Something was done: a law switched on, a tariff imposed, money committed. How evidence is weighed
Who: Government of Canada (acted)

Articles that cite this record

The forecast

Sources

Parliament of Canada (LEGISinfo), “Bill C-5 (45-1): An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act and the Building Canada Act” (external site). source record
Justice Laws (Canada), “Building Canada Act (S.C. 2025, c. 2, s. 5), full text” (external site). source record
Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat (Government of Canada), “Legislation to build One Canadian Economy receives Royal Assent” (external site), June 2025. source record

Laws and agreements

One Canadian Economy Act (incl. Building Canada Act) (C-5): this event is its “Royal Assent” stage

Claims that rest on this event

SupportsMechanism
US trade pressure since 2025 gave Ottawa the political cover to clear permitting and political blockages, producing permanent laws (fast-track permitting and investment tax cuts) that unlock a second wave of output.
Parliament passed the federal fast-track law (the Building Canada Act) in June 2025, within months of the US tariffs.
SupportsMechanism
Winning parties rarely spelled out their controversial fast-track tools before the vote: in our own count of 41 post-election actions by five tariff-period winners, checked against their platforms, 2 of 19 controversial actions were clearly promised, against 14 of 22 routine ones. The rally widened what could be done after the vote. This is a way to read platforms, not proof of concealment, and it supports 'Ottawa opportunistic' only weakly.
Broad fast-track powers (deemed approvals, exemptions from federal laws) passed within two months of the April 2025 election.
SupportsOttawa
Ottawa is opportunistic, following 'never waste a good crisis': it used the mandate and political cover of the tariff era to pass fast-track and tax tools. This judgment says nothing about Washington's intent.
Ottawa passed its fast-track law in under three weeks amid the tariff crisis.
ContextTested hypothesis: intent
In the foresight thought experiment, a timing test found US tariff actions near Canada's 14 steps to lock in the build-out at chance level (9 against 8.3 expected), and US provocations rarer than chance. The test has little power. It rules out a scripted campaign, but says little about 'foreseen and wanted', which needs no timing.
One of the Canadian steps to lock in the build-out that the timing test checks US actions against.

How it bears on the outcome

Explanation	Fit	Why
O0 No meaningful speed-up	Against weak	A federal law letting cabinet deem approvals in favour of national-interest projects, passed in under three weeks, would be somewhat surprising if no speed-up followed; a law alone is not yet faster building.
O1 Faster, but the extra output goes mostly elsewhere	Fits weak	The fast-track law fits a speed-up equally whichever buyers get the extra output; it says nothing about destination.
O2 Faster, and more volume reaches the US (this level or higher)	Fits weak	The fast-track law fits a speed-up equally whichever buyers get the extra output; it says nothing about destination.
O3 Locked-in preferential terms for the US	Fits weak	The law fits the speed-up part of this reading, but no preferential or locked-in terms for the US are observed.