The odds
These are our estimates, not expert forecasts, published so you can see what we track and where we lean. Some come from simple models built on comparable past cases, the rest from our judgment; each one’s reason says which. We put a number only on questions that a dated, public event can settle. Why Washington acted is not one of them, so those readings carry no odds: they are tested in the open instead. Many forecasts will miss, and that is expected. What carries the weight is the evidence in the articles. Each one links to its history and the reasons it moved; the Method page explains how the odds work.
Where the outcome stands
Our current estimate of where the build-out lands, as shares that add up to 100%. Estimates, not measurements; as of .
- O0/O1Little or no extra reaching the USEither no real speed-up, or faster building with the extra output going mostly to other buyers. No separate estimate for each; this is what is left over.15%together
- O2Faster, and more reaches the USCanada builds faster and more volume reaches the US, even if the US share of Canada’s exports falls. Canada also gains routes to other buyers.62%odds
- O3More to the US, on locked-in termsAs O2, plus preferential terms for the US written down: trade-deal clauses, supply guarantees or US ownership.23%odds
The precise definitions: O0 · O1 · O2 · O3. On the O2 page, the figure counts “O2 or higher”, so it includes O3. This bar splits them into “O2 only” and O3, so its parts add up to 100%.
How Ottawa is playing it
These are not rival answers where only one can be true: Ottawa can be opportunistic and in no hurry at the same time. They carry no odds, because no dated event could settle whether a description “fits”. Each is a lens for reading what Ottawa does; the evidence for each is on its page.
| Reading |
|---|
| C0 Ottawa as victim Victim: Ottawa is simply on the receiving end of the pressure. |
| C1 Ottawa opportunistic Opportunistic: Ottawa uses the crisis ("never waste a good crisis"). |
| C2 Ottawa in no hurry In no hurry: Ottawa didn't ask for the crisis and isn't rushing to end it. It walked away from the tentative deal announced on 18 August … |
| C3 Ottawa coordinating with Washington Ottawa is coordinating with Washington. Judged unlikely: it would be unnecessary, and too costly. |
Tested hypotheses: a thought experiment
Suppose Washington foresaw and wanted this. What would we expect to see, and do we see it?
This is a deliberately contrarian thought experiment, not the author’s belief. The journal’s claims are about the outcome above, which holds whether or not anyone intended it. The foresight reading is always shown with its rivals (accident, plain self-interest, annexation or fragmentation), and the tests come before the verdicts. No reading here carries odds: intent can’t be observed, so no event could settle such a number. What we publish instead is what each reading predicts and what the searches found.
The tests first
16 predictions registered in advance say what each reading expects. 1 settled so far:
- P14: "Was it foreseen?" (foresight test 1) Scored
Nothing found tied to administration circles, in the foresight search and its follow-up. Outside analysts did warn that pressure could push Canada to diversify, but none of them close to the administration, and an insider asked directly (Energy Secretary Chris Wright, February 2025) dismissed the idea. Under this test that is weak evidence for plain self-interest: it counts against the foresight readings, though only a little, because private foresight would not show up in public sources.
The full scorecard, including what would count against each reading.
What the evidence says so far
Of 207 events judged against both the plain self-interest reading (I0b) and the foresight reading (I2), 135 fit both equally: they are non-discriminating and cannot tell the two apart. Of the rest, 7 fit the foresight reading better and 65 the self-interest reading.
The readings side by side
| Reading | What it says |
|---|---|
| I0a Accident | Accident: impulse, grudges and domestic politics drive US policy; the pattern lines up by coincidence. |
| I0b Plain self-interest; Canada's response not considered | Plain US self-interest. Canada's build-out response wasn't considered; it is a side effect. |
| I1 Foreseen and welcomed, not the reason | Canada's response was foreseen and welcomed, but it isn't why the pressure was applied. |
| I2 Foreseen and wanted (this level or higher) | A thought experiment, not the author's view. The pressure was applied at least partly because Canada's predictable response (permitting, building and exporting) serves US goals. This needs foresight and desire, not management or timing. |
| I3 Worked-out plan with specific targets part of I2 | The strongest version of the foresight thought experiment: a worked-out plan with specific targets (named projects, a timeline). |
| R-weaken Weaken-Canada rivals (annexation or fragmentation) (rival) | Annexation and fragmentation: the goal is to weaken Canada as a country. The two are scored together as one estimate, because nothing yet separates them. |
| R-annex Annexation (rival) part of R-weaken | The goal is to absorb or subordinate Canada. This reading predicts "no deal ever", not "no deal yet". |
| R-frag Fragmentation (rival) part of R-weaken | The US may be trying to break Canada up, not make it build. |
Indented rows are nested inside the row above them. Wording used here: “consistent with”, “fits equally”, “not observed in public sources”.
Tail risks
Low-probability risks, tracked with warning indicators: these are not forecasts. Separate questions, so they don’t add up to 100% and are not part of the readings above. Each is the chance that the description happens by its date, with its range.
| Reading | What it says | Odds | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 US military action against Canada | US forces carry out a kinetic or occupying military action against Canadian territory, forces or infrastructure by 2027-12-31. Excludes cyber operations, border enforcement, and routine joint exercises. | 0.05% 0.05%–2% | 6 October 2026 |
| M2 US refuses to rule out force against Canada | A senior US official (President, Vice-President, White House press secretary, a cabinet secretary, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) publicly declines to rule out the use of military force against Canada, in answer to a question or unprompted, by 2027-12-31. Calling force unlikely without excluding it does not count; refusing to answer when asked directly about Canada, or calling force an option, does. Only statements made after September 28, 2026, when the question was registered, count. | 13% 3%–27% | 6 October 2026 |
Warning indicators, registered in advance: P17: "Shared skies hold" · P18: "Normal diplomatic posture" · P19: "Gripen triggers NORAD threat" · P20: "NATO-invasion bill stays parked". All predictions, with what each one would show.
How the odds are set
Each estimate is revised only with a reason on record: new evidence, a review pass, a challenge or a change of definition. Every change is in the corrections log and on each reading’s own page. The method explains how evidence is weighed.