EventDocument
Canada Energy Regulator: Trans Mountain carried an average of 761,000 barrels a day in 2025, up 37% from 2024
In a Market Snapshot published on 24 June 2026, the Canada Energy Regulator reported that the Trans Mountain system transported an average of 761 thousand barrels per day in 2025, up 37% from 555 thousand in 2024, at 85% average utilization. It set a monthly record of 855 thousand barrels per day in November 2025. The Trans Mountain Expansion, in service since May 2024, nearly tripled the system's capacity: available capacity averaged 892 thousand barrels per day in 2025, against 350 thousand in 2023. The regulator said exports from the Westridge Marine Terminal surged, "particularly heavy crude oil destined for Asia and the U.S. West Coast, marking a shift in Canadian oil export patterns."
- Date
- Kind
- Other
- Where
- Canada
- Evidence
- Document: An official document: a bill, a filing, an agreement text. How evidence is weighed
- Who
- Canada Energy Regulator (acted)
Sources
- Canada Energy Regulator, “Market Snapshot: Oil pipeline throughputs remained high in 2025” (external site), . source record
Projects
Claims that rest on this event
- On the current course, intended or not, both countries win from Canada's resource build-out. The US gets more supply, and the new southbound capacity arrives first, from 2027. Canada gets a bigger resource base and the capacity to sell elsewhere, which shifts bargaining power toward it.
The Canada Energy Regulator reports that Trans Mountain carried 761,000 barrels a day in 2025, up 37%, and that exports from its Westridge terminal surged, particularly heavy crude bound for Asia and the US West Coast: Canada's capacity to sell elsewhere is real in volume.
- Canada's export diversification so far is more than half gold, and most of the rest is raw materials. Statistics Canada's headline figure, which includes gold, put the US share of goods exports at 69.8% in August 2026, up from 66.1% in July (balance-of-payments basis, seasonally adjusted). Leaving out gold sent to the UK, our calculation from customs data puts the US share at 79.1% in January-August 2024 and 74.6% in January-August 2026, and it has stayed around 74-75% in most months since April 2025 (monthly range about 72-78%). Of the rise in non-US exports between those two periods, about 52% is gold sent to the UK, and about two-thirds of the rest is raw materials. These are values, not volumes, and they say nothing about Washington's intent.
Trans Mountain volumes rose 37% in 2025 and exports from its coast terminal surged, particularly heavy crude bound for Asia and the US West Coast (Canada Energy Regulator): part of the shift away from the US is real in volume, not just value, on a pipeline expanded before the tariffs.
- What the build-out costs the US is leverage, not supply. US leverage rested on Canada having few other buyers: in 2025 about 90% of Canadian crude exports by volume went to the US, the coast took 12.5% of oil export pipeline capacity, and LNG exports had barely started. The loss comes late: new US-bound oil capacity arrives first (2027-29), while most of the capacity to sell elsewhere comes around 2034.
Captivity already eroding via the 2024 Trans Mountain expansion.
- In the thought experiment's third foresight test ('Rerouting constraint'), no US action yet limits Canada's ability to sell elsewhere: no measure against its coast projects or named overseas buyers, and no clause on sales to other countries. The closest items are demands, not actions: a right of first refusal on critical minerals and limits on Canada's other trade deals, both refused in August 2026. If the US keeps tolerating the rerouting, that fits 'foreseen and wanted' slightly better than a plain self-interest focused on leverage.
Trans Mountain's coast exports surged in 2025, particularly heavy crude bound for Asia and the US West Coast (Canada Energy Regulator), and we found no US measure against these exports.
- Output is measured as export capacity for now and as actual volumes later. The journal's volume model adds different commodities together at fixed prices, so a price rise never counts as growth; trade values must be split into price and volume before they are used for the outcome.
Volume data that do carry the shift.
- On the current course, intended or not, Canada's resource build-out pays for both countries; the trade war doesn't. The US gets more supply, and the new southbound capacity arrives first, from 2027: it gets more supply either way; counted as income, the build-out pays it a little, but the trade war costs it more, so it comes out ahead in 2034 only if nearly all of today's tariff damage is gone. Canada gets a bigger resource base and the capacity to sell elsewhere, which shifts bargaining power toward it. By 2034, Canada comes out ahead unless most of today's tariffs are still in place; but the decade as a whole leaves it behind, and the longer the tariffs last, the less of it comes back.
The Canada Energy Regulator reports that Trans Mountain carried 761,000 barrels a day in 2025, up 37%, and that exports from its Westridge terminal surged, particularly heavy crude bound for Asia and the US West Coast: Canada's capacity to sell elsewhere is real in volume.
How it bears on the outcome
| Explanation | Fit | Why |
|---|---|---|
| O0 No meaningful speed-up | Neutral weak | Higher throughput reflects a pipeline in service since May 2024, built before the crisis; it shows use of existing capacity, not a faster build-out. |
| O1 Faster, but the extra output goes mostly elsewhere | Fits weak | Consistent with more heavy crude going to Asia, though the regulator also names the US West Coast as a destination. |
| O2 Faster, and more volume reaches the US (this level or higher) | Fits weak | Consistent with some extra volume reaching the US West Coast; the split between Asia and the US is not given. |
| O3 Locked-in preferential terms for the US | Neutral weak | No US preferential terms are involved. |