EventStatement
CSIS (Baskaran): tariffs on Canadian minerals would bring Canadian retaliation, send Canadian buyers of US minerals to other suppliers and push US firms toward Chinese-controlled nickel
Writing on Jan 29, 2025, before the first tariff order, Gracelin Baskaran of CSIS's Critical Minerals Security Program warned that a 25% tariff on Canadian minerals would cost US buyers about $11.75 billion; that Canada would likely retaliate, as in 2018, leading Canadian firms to buy the minerals they now import from the US elsewhere; and that US manufacturers would turn to cheaper Indonesian nickel produced largely by Chinese companies, working against US efforts to reduce reliance on China. She did not forecast Canada building new export routes.
- Date
- Kind
- Statement
- Where
- United States
- Evidence
- Statement: Something was said. Weighted lowest: words cost less than actions. How evidence is weighed
- Who
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (acted); Gracelin Baskaran (acted)
Sources
Quotes
“Canada would likely adopt retaliatory tariffs… encouraging them to turn to other import sources for off-take, further undermining U.S. firms.”
From CSIS: Canadian Tariffs Will Undermine U.S. Minerals Security, paragraph beginning "Canada would likely adopt retaliatory tariffs"
Claims that rest on this event
- Canada's build-out was not obvious in advance. The US Energy Secretary said new Canadian pipelines were hard to build and did not expect the oil trade to change; conservative US analysts expected only a Conservative government to unleash oil and gas; and after Northern Gateway and Energy East fell through, 'Canada won't build' was a reasonable default. Some analysts foresaw Canada selling elsewhere, but in the US public record we found no one who predicted it would build fast and keep supplying the US. It is a surprising result that needs explaining.
Analysts expected tariffs to send Canadian buyers of US minerals to other suppliers; this is about where Canadian firms source mineral imports, not about Canada selling elsewhere.
- In the thought experiment's first foresight test ('Was it foreseen?'), we found nothing tied to administration circles predicting that pressure would push Canada to permit, build and export; the one insider asked directly, Energy Secretary Wright, dismissed the idea. Analysts outside the administration did warn that tariffs could push Canada to sell elsewhere. The result counted only as weak evidence for plain self-interest, because private foresight would not appear in public sources.
Mainstream analysts outside the administration did foresee a Canadian diversification response.
Tested hypotheses: a thought experiment
Suppose Washington foresaw and wanted this. Would this event look any different than under the rival readings? This is a deliberately contrarian test, explained here, not the author’s belief. Judgments, not measurements.
Non-discriminating: this event fits the plain self-interest reading and the foresight reading equally. It does not tell them apart. What this means
| Reading | Fit | Why |
|---|---|---|
| I0a Accident Tested hypothesis (intent) | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| I0b Plain self-interest; Canada's response not considered Tested hypothesis (intent) | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| I1 Foreseen and welcomed, not the reason Tested hypothesis (intent) | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| I2 Foreseen and wanted (this level or higher) Tested hypothesis (intent) | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| I3 Worked-out plan with specific targets Tested hypothesis (intent) | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| R-annex Annexation Rival reading | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| R-frag Fragmentation Rival reading | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |
| R-weaken Weaken-Canada rivals (annexation or fragmentation) Rival reading | Neutral weak | An outside analyst's warning that tariffs would trigger retaliation and push buyers elsewhere fits all readings equally; it is not an administration view and does not forecast a Canadian build-out. |