Who holds the veto, part 2

Does opposition stop projects?

In the record so far, resource projects that faced organized First Nations opposition reached construction about as often as those that didn't. The samples are tiny, and the record leaves our forecast where it was.

By W.F.Published Updated 17 min readSources and method

Updated since publication: 1 correction

Also in French: L'opposition arrête-t-elle les projets?

Correction. When we published this piece, we said the record did not clear the bar of the rule we wrote first, because our forecast gave an approved project one chance in two. The forecast's odds for approved projects now come from a larger study of past projects, about three in ten, and against that the record would clear the bar for Ksi Lisims LNG and Kudz Ze Kayah. The forecast does not apply it: it follows the larger study's own rule for opposition, which found no effect. The finding on opposition is unchanged, and the corrections log has the old wording.

We expected organized First Nations opposition to lower the odds that a resource project gets built, and tested that before letting it into our forecast. In the record so far, it doesn't show. Projects that faced court challenges, blockades or formal interventions reached construction about as often as projects that faced none.

The samples are tiny, so this is a null result: it doesn't show that opposition never matters. But it is what the record shows, and the cases suggest why: the projects that died mostly died of decisions by governments and companies, and the ones that were fought hardest were often the ones with the most behind them.

What the record shows

When the opposition began Projects facing organized opposition Projects without it
During review, before final approval 2 of 4 reached construction 2 of 8
After approval, before construction 4 of 7 1 of 2

What counts. A project counts as opposed when at least one First Nation, Métis or Inuit community against it went to court, blockaded it, or intervened formally with a regulator or by letter; a statement alone doesn't count. The comparison group is projects on which nations took public positions but organized no opposition of that kind. "Reached construction" means built, in service or under construction by 30 September 2026. Only cases that began by 2022 are counted, so each had at least three years to play out.

Claim · mechanismIn the record so far, resource projects facing organized First Nations, Métis or Inuit opposition reached construction about as often as those without it (approved: 4 of 7 vs 1 of 2; under review: 2 of 4 vs 2 of 8); tiny, selected samples.
In the record so far, resource projects facing organized First Nations, Métis or Inuit opposition reached construction about as often as those without it (approved: 4 of 7 vs 1 of 2; under review: 2 of 4 vs 2 of 8); tiny, selected samples.
Rests on 11 pieces of evidence

The opposed projects that were built. Trans Mountain's expansion approval was quashed in 2018, and the pipeline entered service in May 2024.1 Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs issued an eviction notice to Coastal GasLink in January 2020; the pipeline was declared in service in November 2024.2 The Canadian segment of Line 3, the Site C dam and the Manitoba–Minnesota transmission line were also built, and NexGen's Rook I uranium mine received its construction licence in March 2026.3

Event · 2018-08-30 · action · CAFederal Court of Appeal quashes the Trans Mountain expansion approval over marine shipping and inadequate consultation
Federal Court of Appeal quashes the Trans Mountain expansion approval over marine shipping and inadequate consultation

In Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (2018 FCA 153), the Federal Court of Appeal quashed Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069, which had approved the Trans Mountain expansion, rendering the National Energy Board's certificate a nullity. The court found that the Board had wrongly left project-related tanker traffic out of its review, and that at the last stage of consultation, Phase III, Canada had failed to engage in meaningful dialogue with the Indigenous applicants about their concerns. It sent the decision back to cabinet for prompt redetermination.

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Event · 2024-05-01 · action · CAThe Trans Mountain expansion enters commercial service, nearly tripling the pipeline's capacity
The Trans Mountain expansion enters commercial service, nearly tripling the pipeline's capacity

The expanded pipeline from Alberta to Burnaby, BC began commercial operations on May 1, 2024, nine months before the first US tariff order on Canada. Approved in 2016 and bought by Ottawa in 2018, it was completed under public ownership.

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Event · 2020-01-05 · statement · CA/CA-BCWet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs issue an eviction notice to Coastal GasLink
Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs issue an eviction notice to Coastal GasLink

Days after the BC Supreme Court granted Coastal GasLink an interlocutory injunction (Dec. 31, 2019), the hereditary chiefs issued an eviction notice to the company citing Wet'suwet'en trespass laws. The chiefs hold that no pipeline may cross their traditional territory without their consent, and that the band councils, five of six of which had signed agreements supporting the pipeline, are responsible only for their reserves (CBC News, Feb. 5, 2020).

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Event · 2024-11-18 · action · CA-BCCoastal GasLink declared commercially in service
Coastal GasLink declared commercially in service

Coastal GasLink LP signed a commercial agreement with LNG Canada and its five participants declaring the pipeline commercially in service, with tolls retroactive to Oct. 1, 2024. Mechanical completion and commissioning had been reached in 2023.

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Event · 2026-03-05 · action · CACNSC licenses NexGen to prepare the site for and build its Rook I uranium mine and mill in Saskatchewan, valid to 31 March 2036
CNSC licenses NexGen to prepare the site for and build its Rook I uranium mine and mill in Saskatchewan, valid to 31 March 2036

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission announced on 5 March 2026 that it had issued NexGen Energy a licence to prepare a site for and construct its Rook I uranium mine and mill in northern Saskatchewan, after a two-part public hearing in November 2025 and February 2026. The licence is valid until 31 March 2036 and does not authorize operation, which would need a separate licence after a future Commission hearing. NexGen says the mine is permitted to produce up to 30 million pounds of uranium a year and will place paste tailings back underground, with no surface tailings facility. World Nuclear News reported that the company planned to start construction officially that summer and expected it to take about four years.

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The opposed projects that weren't. Four were cancelled. The Federal Court of Appeal quashed Northern Gateway's approval in 2016 on challenges brought by First Nations;4 the federal cabinet ended the project that November.5 Ottawa rejected Baffinland's Mary River expansion in 2022, the minister citing the Inuit organizations' lack of support.6 Fort McKay First Nation won a 2020 ruling that set aside the approval of Prosper's Rigel oil sands project, which was withdrawn in 2021.78

The fourth, and one still waiting. The Alton gas storage project in Nova Scotia, fought by Sipekne'katik in court, was cancelled by its owner, AltaGas, in 2021.9 Kudz Ze Kayah, a Yukon copper, lead and zinc mine, is approved but not built.

Event · 2016-06-23 · action · CAFederal Court of Appeal quashes the Northern Gateway approval for inadequate consultation with First Nations
Federal Court of Appeal quashes the Northern Gateway approval for inadequate consultation with First Nations

In Gitxaala Nation v. Canada (2016 FCA 187), a 2-1 majority quashed the 2014 Order in Council and the National Energy Board's certificates because Canada had not adequately consulted affected First Nations, and sent the decision back to cabinet.

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Event · 2016-11-29 · action · CATrudeau cabinet directs the regulator to dismiss Northern Gateway, while approving the Trans Mountain expansion and Line 3
Trudeau cabinet directs the regulator to dismiss Northern Gateway, while approving the Trans Mountain expansion and Line 3

Prime Minister Trudeau announced that the government had directed the National Energy Board to dismiss the Northern Gateway application ('The Great Bear Rainforest is no place for a pipeline'), ending the project, and approved the Trans Mountain expansion and the Line 3 replacement.

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Event · 2022-11-16 · action · CA/CA-NUNorthern Affairs Minister rejects Baffinland's Mary River Phase 2 expansion
Northern Affairs Minister rejects Baffinland's Mary River Phase 2 expansion

Minister Dan Vandal accepted the review board's recommendation and rejected the expansion, which would have doubled output to 12 million tonnes a year and added a 110-kilometre railway to Milne Inlet. His letter cited the Inuit organizations' Oct. 25 letter; he said their lack of support played into his decision and that the mine sits on Inuit-owned land, not Crown land (CBC News; Nunatsiaq News, Nov. 16, 2022).

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Event · 2020-04-24 · action · CA/CA-ABAlberta Court of Appeal sets aside the Rigel approval and sends it back to the regulator
Alberta Court of Appeal sets aside the Rigel approval and sends it back to the regulator

In Fort McKay First Nation v Prosper Petroleum (2020 ABCA 163), the court unanimously allowed Fort McKay's appeal. The majority held that the AER took an unreasonably narrow view of the public interest by declining to consider the state of the Moose Lake negotiations between Fort McKay and the Crown (para. 68); the court vacated the approval and directed the AER to reconsider it, taking into account the honour of the Crown and the Moose Lake process (para. 71). Fort McKay had asked that the matter go back to the regulator to decide whether the project should be delayed, approved or denied (para. 69). Fort McKay called it 'an historic victory for Treaty rights' (release, Apr. 24, 2020).

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Event · 2021-10-22 · action · CA-NSAltaGas cancels the Alton natural gas storage project in Nova Scotia
AltaGas cancels the Alton natural gas storage project in Nova Scotia

Alton Gas, a subsidiary of Calgary-based AltaGas, said it would not continue developing the underground natural gas storage project on the Shubenacadie River and would decommission it. Its release cited the 2018 sale of its Nova Scotia utility, the repositioning of its business and the challenging economics of the storage project, and said the project had received mixed support, challenges and delay. The project had been on hold since Mi'kmaw protests began in 2014; in March 2020 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court ruled that the province had to resume consultation with Sipekne'katik First Nation. Nova Scotia's natural resources minister called it a business decision by the company (CBC News, Oct. 22, 2021).

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Why the brake doesn't show

Courts send approvals back; governments and companies end projects. That was the finding of the first piece in this series, and these cases fit it. Rigel is the closest to a project stopped by a court ruling, and even there the end came after Alberta adopted a land plan for the area the nation had fought to protect. Alton's owner gave the project's economics and its own change of strategy as reasons alongside the delays.

The biggest projects draw the biggest fights. Trans Mountain, Coastal GasLink and Site C were large, advanced and backed by governments or major companies. The same weight that makes a project worth fighting helps it push through. A project that dies quietly before anyone files in court never enters a count like this one.

Claim · mechanismConsultation gives First Nations no veto. Courts send approvals back for more consultation but rarely end projects: Trans Mountain's approval was quashed in 2018, granted again in 2019, and the pipeline was built. A nation that objects usually ends with an agreement or with an approval over its objection, so a nation that opposes and later signs reveals nothing about its motive. Provinces and towns holding the same lever end the same way.
Consultation gives First Nations no veto. Courts send approvals back for more consultation but rarely end projects: Trans Mountain's approval was quashed in 2018, granted again in 2019, and the pipeline was built. A nation that objects usually ends with an agreement or with an approval over its objection, so a nation that opposes and later signs reveals nothing about its motive. Provinces and towns holding the same lever end the same way.
Rests on 9 pieces of evidence

We didn't measure delay. A project that reached construction years late counts the same here as one that ran on time. Opposition may cost time and money without changing whether a project gets built; this test can't tell.

What our larger study found

A wider search. Our larger study of past Canadian resource and energy projects covered nearly 400 projects of C$100 million or more listed since the mid-2000s. It searched each for court challenges, formal interventions in hearings and sustained campaigns (blockades, council resolutions, organized protest) by anyone, and measured how often projects reached construction within eight years of a given stage.

The results point both ways. Challenged projects reached construction 5.8 points more often than the others (67 projects challenged). Those facing a court case or a campaign did 16.7 points worse (23 projects), and those facing a campaign 32.5 points worse (9.8% against 42.3%), but only 10 projects faced one. Challenges by First Nations, Métis or Inuit groups made almost no difference.

One stage has enough projects for a broad comparison. At the approved stage, the only one before construction with enough projects on both sides (20 or more), projects with any challenge reached construction 25.7 points less often (26.0% against 51.6%; 29 and 34 projects). The study's rule tests only campaigns, and court cases with campaigns, so this broad comparison adds nothing to the forecast (below), but we report it.

The gaps are weak evidence. Ten is very few, and a campaign may follow a project's trouble rather than cause it. Many interventions were about costs, routes or conditions, not stopping a project. And the measure is construction within eight years of a stage, not by 30 September 2026 as in the table above.

No stage meets the study's own bar. Its rule, written before its data were seen, needs at least 20 projects challenged in court or by a campaign, and 20 not, in the same stage; none has more than 10. Nothing is added to the forecast.

What it does to our forecast

Nothing: the forecast follows a broader rule. The rule we wrote first lets the record into the forecast only for a stage with at least five opposed cases, and only where their rate differs by at least 15 points from the comparison group or, when that group is too small, from the odds the forecast already gives that stage. But our forecast's odds for approved and postponed projects now come from a larger study of past Canadian resource and energy projects, whose own rule, fixed before its data were seen, adds a factor for opposition (organized campaigns and court challenges) only for a stage with at least 20 opposed and 20 unopposed projects whose rates differ by 15 points or more. No stage has that many, so the study found no effect to add, and the forecast does not apply the record below.

Three projects in the forecast face organized opposition today. The Gitanyow Hereditary Chiefs, whose court petition was dismissed, have asked banks not to finance Ksi Lisims LNG.10 Kudz Ze Kayah was re-approved in April 2026 over the Kaska's objection.11 Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs, who blockaded Coastal GasLink, say they have not consented to its expansion, which LNG Canada's second phase needs; we count that project through the pipeline that supplies it.12

Event · 2025-12-02 · statement · CA/CA-BCGitanyow Hereditary Chiefs ask banks not to finance Ksi Lisims LNG
Gitanyow Hereditary Chiefs ask banks not to finance Ksi Lisims LNG

A letter signed on behalf of the Simgigyet'm Gitanyow asked financial institutions in Canada, the United States and Europe not to provide project financing or consider equity investments in Ksi Lisims LNG, to deny general corporate financing to its developers, and to require free, prior and informed consent from all affected Indigenous communities, as set out in BC's Declaration Act (letter as published by Peace Brigades International - Canada, Dec. 2, 2025).

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Event · 2026-04-10 · action · CA-YTYukon and federal governments approve the Kudz Ze Kayah mine again despite Kaska opposition, saying 'consent may not always be achievable'
Yukon and federal governments approve the Kudz Ze Kayah mine again despite Kaska opposition, saying 'consent may not always be achievable'

On 10 April 2026, the Yukon and federal governments issued a new decision allowing BMC Minerals' proposed Kudz Ze Kayah copper, lead and zinc mine near Ross River, Yukon, to proceed with 52 terms and conditions, CBC News reported. An earlier approval had been quashed after the Yukon Court of Appeal ruled in 2024 that the governments needed to consult on the project's economic feasibility. According to CBC, the governments' written decision said that "Kaska made it clear that consent has not been provided for the project," that they had sought Kaska consent throughout consultation, and that they "recognize that consent may not always be achievable." The Ross River Dena Council called the decision "a severe and unjustified infringement" of Kaska Aboriginal title and rights. BMC Minerals called it a "major de-risking milestone" and said it aims for a final investment decision by late 2027.

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Event · 2026-09-29 · statement · CA-BCWet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs and environmental groups say LNG Canada Phase 2 has no business case without public subsidies
Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs and environmental groups say LNG Canada Phase 2 has no business case without public subsidies

Caution: single source Original release not located; wording from a compilation. Only one outlet has reported it.

After the Phase 2 investment decision, Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs (including Chief Na'Moks and Sleydo') and Gidimt'en, with Gitxsan voices and groups including the David Suzuki Foundation, Stand.earth, Dogwood, Wilderness Committee, Environmental Defence and the Skeena Watershed Conservation Coalition, said the expansion depends on public subsidies and that hereditary chiefs have not consented to the Coastal GasLink expansion (statements compiled by Raven Coast, 29 September 2026). The Narwhal reported the same day that LNG Canada had reported flaring not consistent with its air discharge permit (BC Energy Regulator). The hereditary chiefs' standing concerns the Coastal GasLink route, not the Kitimat site. No action announced.

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Two of them would clear the first rule's bar. Ksi Lisims and Kudz Ze Kayah are approved; the forecast now gives an approved project about three chances in ten (29%), and the opposed record's 4 in 7 is more than 15 points above that. LNG Canada's second phase began early construction on 1 October,13 a stage with no opposed cases old enough to count. The forecast does not apply the record, so our volume model puts about 85% on clearly more Canadian resources reaching the US in 2034 than in 2024.

Event · 2026-10-01 · action · CA-BCLNG Canada Phase 2 early construction begins days after the investment decision; JGC-Fluor joint venture holds the EPC contract (Fluor's share US$7.5 billion)
LNG Canada Phase 2 early construction begins days after the investment decision; JGC-Fluor joint venture holds the EPC contract (Fluor's share US$7.5 billion)

Early construction on LNG Canada Phase 2 at Kitimat began on 2026-10-01 (water treatment, grading, excavation, piling for a second storage tank, jetty and marine work), planned to run about four months to February 2027, with up to 4,000 construction jobs at peak (The Northern View, 2026-10-08). On 2026-09-29 Fluor said its 50/50 joint venture with JGC (JGC Fluor BC LNG II) was selected for engineering, procurement, fabrication, construction and commissioning of the two new trains and storage tank, Fluor's share being US$7.5 billion (Fluor release).

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Applied anyway, the record would move that by about 0.6 points, and down. Opposed approved projects reached construction far more often than the forecast's odds for an approved project, so their rate makes Ksi Lisims more likely. More LNG shipped from the coast means a little less gas for the US.

The direction depends on what is opposed. Opposition that holds up coast-bound projects keeps more for the US, while opposition to a pipeline or power line heading south would cut it. In the record, the organized opposition is to coast-bound projects; none of the south-bound projects in our forecast faces it.

ProjectKsi Lisims LNG
Ksi Lisims LNG
lng · goes tidewater · approved · 12.0 Mtpa · BC

Proposed floating LNG export project with capacity of 12 million tonnes a year on Nisga'a Nation land at Pearse Island, BC, co-developed by the Nisga'a Nation, Rockies LNG and Houston-based Western LNG, with gas to come through the proposed Prince Rupert Gas Transmission pipeline. It received its federal and provincial environmental approvals on September 15, 2025 and was referred to the federal Major Projects Office on November 13, 2025; no final investment decision had been taken by late September 2026. Announced buyers total 8 million tonnes a year: Shell (2, sale and purchase agreement finalized January 2024), TotalEnergies (2, May 2025, conditional on the investment decision), Uniper (2, signed July 2026, deliveries from 2032), and non-binding deals with SEFE (1, May 2026) and Santos (1, September 2026). None of the announced buyers is a US company, and Uniper's volumes can go to any destination.

Who pays

For nations, the result is not reassuring. If organized opposition rarely changes whether a project gets built, a nation that fights one mostly bears the project's effects anyway, along with the cost of the fight. As the first piece found, many who asked for a stop or a say got neither. For the build-out, it means opposition is not the main risk to the volumes our forecast counts.

What this can't tell

The samples are small and selected. Eleven opposed projects and ten without opposition in the two stages shown, all with public positions found in free sources. Every mature case predates the 2025 fast-track laws, which may change the odds either way.

One rule came late. The 15-point bar for changing the forecast was written after we had seen the opposed counts, though before the comparison group was coded and before any model run.

It doesn't set our stage odds. The forecast's odds for approved and postponed projects come from the larger study: about 29% of the projects it found at the approved stage since 2014 were in service within eight years. That is a stricter test than reaching construction, on a broader set than the projects here, which all drew public positions. The odds for the other stages are still our judgment; the record here has too few projects past a final investment decision to check the higher odds the forecast gives those.

What comes next. The series follows the cases as they unfold: Ksi Lisims, Baffinland's Steensby plan, the Innu Nation's vote on its Hydro-Québec settlement and the Trans Mountain equity offer. This test will be rerun as cases mature, under rules fixed first, and published whichever way it comes out.

Sources

  1. Canada Development Investment Corporation (CDEV), “Trans Mountain Announces Milestones of Commercial Service for Expanded System”, 2024-05-01. ↩
  2. TC Energy (SEC EDGAR), “TC Energy Corporation Annual Information Form 2024 (Form 40-F exhibit)”, 2025-02-14. ↩
  3. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “Commission issues a licence to NexGen Energy Ltd. authorizing site preparation and construction of its Rook I Project”, 2026-03-05. ↩
  4. Federal Court of Appeal, “Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2016 FCA 187”, 2016-06-23. ↩
  5. Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's pipeline announcement”, 2016-11-29. ↩
  6. CBC News, “Northern Affairs minister says no to Baffinland mine expansion”, 2022-11-16. ↩
  7. Court of Appeal of Alberta (copy hosted by ABlawg), “Fort McKay First Nation v Prosper Petroleum Ltd, 2020 ABCA 163”, 2020-04-24. ↩
  8. Alberta Energy Regulator, “Costs Order 2021-03: Prosper Petroleum Limited, Rigel Oil Sands Project”, 2021-12-13. ↩
  9. CBC News, “Alton Gas project cancelled after years of opposition”, 2021-10-22. ↩
  10. Peace Brigades International - Canada, “The Simigigyet'm Gitanyow call on multiple financial institutions not to finance the Ksi Lisims LNG project”, 2025-12-02. ↩
  11. CBC News, “Kudz Ze Kayah mine project in Yukon approved again, while First Nation blasts decision”, 2026-04-14. ↩
  12. Raven Coast (Substack), “For the record: LNG Canada Phase 2 positive FID news releases pro and con”, 2026-09-29. ↩
  13. The Northern View, “Construction begins on LNG Canada Phase 2 just days after investment decision”, 2026-10-08. ↩

Changes since publication

A correction fixes something that was wrong. An update records the world moving: odds revised, a prediction settled, data refreshed. Newest first.

The charts, odds tables and other records embedded in this article always show the current data, so some figures may differ from the day it was published. This list records what changed since then.

  1. CorrectionThis article

    Summary
    Text of the article

    Why: Rewritten for our forecast's new stage odds (resource-exports model O2 v1.4, official run 63): an approved project now gets about 29%, from our study of past Canadian resource and energy projects (share in service within eight years), instead of one chance in two. Against that, the first rule of this test would let the opposition record into the forecast for Ksi Lisims LNG and Kudz Ze Kayah; the forecast follows the study's own rule for opposition instead (a factor only for a stage with at least 20 opposed and 20 unopposed projects; none has that many, no effect found), so the record is reported, not applied. Correction notice added. Volume model 81% -> 85%; the record applied anyway: 0.2 -> 0.6 points; Added a section reporting what our study of past Canadian resource and energy projects found on opposition: projects with any challenge reached construction within eight years 5.8 points more often than unchallenged ones (67 projects challenged); with a court case or a campaign, 16.7 points less often (23 projects); with a campaign, 32.5 points less often (10 projects); challenges by First Nations, Métis or Inuit groups, almost no difference. The gaps rest on few projects, and under the study's rule, set before its data were seen (at least 20 challenged and 20 unchallenged projects in a stage), no stage qualifies, so nothing is added to the forecast. Evidence: the study's comparison of challenged and unchallenged projects (main codes, all stages); Added to the section on our study of past Canadian resource and energy projects: at the approved stage, the only stage before construction with at least 20 challenged and 20 unchallenged projects, projects with any challenge reached construction within eight years 25.7 points less often (26.0% against 51.6%; 29 and 34 projects); the study's rule tests only campaigns and court cases with campaigns, so this adds nothing to the forecast. The paragraph on the study's rule now says its 20-project minimum is about projects challenged in court or by a campaign. Evidence: the study's comparison of challenged and unchallenged projects (main codes, by stage)

    In the corrections log