Event30 January 2025Statement

Atlantic Council (Goldwyn and Webster): energy tariffs on Canada and Mexico could speed US energy partners' diversification away from the US, including toward China

On Jan 30, 2025, two days before the first tariff order, David Goldwyn and Joseph Webster of the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center urged the administration to pause major tariff actions or at least leave energy out. Canada supplied about 62% of US crude imports in the first ten months of 2024, they noted, and markets such as the Midwest have no alternative import supplier of heavy oil. Warning that Brazil, Argentina and other Latin American markets would be watching if Canada and Mexico were targeted, they wrote that "rather than establishing US energy dominance, tariffs on energy products could accelerate the desire of major US hydrocarbon partners to diversify trade with other countries, including China." The piece does not forecast specific pipelines or terminals.

Date: 30 January 2025
Kind: Statement
Where: United States
Evidence: Statement: Something was said. Weighted lowest: words cost less than actions. How evidence is weighed
Who: Atlantic Council (acted); Joseph Webster (acted)

Articles that cite this record

An awkward response

Sources

Atlantic Council, “Tariffs on Canada and Mexico could hurt Trump's quest for US energy dominance” (external site), 30 January 2025. source record

Quotes

“Rather than establishing US energy dominance, tariffs on energy products could accelerate the desire of major US hydrocarbon partners to diversify trade with other countries, including China.”

From Atlantic Council: Tariffs on Canada and Mexico could hurt Trump's quest for US energy dominance, paragraph beginning "The United States should also not discount"

Claims that rest on this event

ComplicatesOutcome
Canada's build-out was not obvious in advance. The US Energy Secretary said new Canadian pipelines were hard to build and did not expect the oil trade to change; conservative US analysts expected only a Conservative government to unleash oil and gas; and after Northern Gateway and Energy East fell through, 'Canada won't build' was a reasonable default. Some analysts foresaw Canada selling elsewhere, but in the US public record we found no one who predicted it would build fast and keep supplying the US. It is a surprising result that needs explaining.
Same: diversification away from the US was foreseen.
ComplicatesTested hypothesis: intent
In the thought experiment's first foresight test ('Was it foreseen?'), we found nothing tied to administration circles predicting that pressure would push Canada to permit, build and export; the one insider asked directly, Energy Secretary Wright, dismissed the idea. Analysts outside the administration did warn that tariffs could push Canada to sell elsewhere. The result counted only as weak evidence for plain self-interest, because private foresight would not appear in public sources.
Mainstream analysts outside the administration did foresee a Canadian diversification response.

Tested hypotheses: a thought experiment

Suppose Washington foresaw and wanted this. Would this event look any different than under the rival readings? This is a deliberately contrarian test, explained here, not the author’s belief. Judgments, not measurements.

Non-discriminating: this event fits the plain self-interest reading and the foresight reading equally. It does not tell them apart. What this means

Reading	Fit	Why
I0a Accident Tested hypothesis (intent)	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
I0b Plain self-interest; Canada's response not considered Tested hypothesis (intent)	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
I1 Foreseen and welcomed, not the reason Tested hypothesis (intent)	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
I2 Foreseen and wanted (this level or higher) Tested hypothesis (intent)	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
I3 Worked-out plan with specific targets Tested hypothesis (intent)	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
R-annex Annexation Rival reading	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
R-frag Fragmentation Rival reading	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.
R-weaken Weaken-Canada rivals (annexation or fragmentation) Rival reading	Neutral weak	Think-tank advice that energy tariffs could push partners to diversify, including toward China, fits all readings equally; it shows the response was publicly foreseeable, not what the administration foresaw or wanted.